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This paper uses SOEP data to study the distributional effect of intergenerational trans-
fers on the wealth distribution of German households. Similar to most other central Eu-
ropean countries, Germany is likely to face a period of increasing aggregate bequest flows.
At the same time, there is an ongoing debate on the distributional implications of such
wealth shocks. This study adds to the discussion by providing causal estimates for the effect
of transfer receipt on the savings behavior of households. The model allows for dynamic
adjustment and variations in the savings behavior over the wealth distribution. I use the
estimates to decompose the overall effect of transfers on wealth inequality in the effect of the
aggregated transfer volume, the transfer incidence over the wealth distribution and the effect
of the savings behavior. The results are very much in line with the literature, indicating that
transfers tend to equalize wealth inequality, despite minor variations in the savings behav-
ior over the wealth distribution and despite a strong relationship between initial household
wealth and transfer accrual.
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1 Introduction
Recent research in economics has paid a lot attention to wealth and its transmission through
inheritances and gifts. While the studies of Piketty [2011] and Piketty and Zucman [2015]
enquire the scale of future aggregate transmissions, other studies have focused on the effects
of intergenerational transfers1 on the inequality in the distribution of households’ net wealth.2
Particularly the contributions by Boserup et al. [2016], Elinder et al. [2016] and Wolff and
Gittleman [2014] reveal the ambivalent nature of intergenerational transfers: Transfer accrual
and transfer scale typically correlate positively with the net-of-transfer wealth of households (a
pattern I will refer to as the incidence effect of transfer accrual). Richer households are hence
more likely to receive transfers and are more likely to receive sizeable transfers than poorer
households. Inheritances thus disequalize the absolute inequality in the wealth distribution. The
corresponding effect on relative wealth inequality however is different: As the relative transfer
size tends to decrease with net-of-transfer wealth, poorer households are more likely to receive
higher relative bequests. The cited papers consistently show that wealth inequality, as usually
measured in economics by relative means, decreases with intergenerational transfers.
Despite this compelling evidence, a further look at the matter appears worthwhile: The distri-
butional effect of transfers on wealth depends strongly on the behavioral response of households
to the transfer receipt. Brown et al. [2010] and Elinder et al. [2012] for instance establish that
individuals demand more leisure after having received a transfer and thus even anticipate their
retirement entry.3 Hence, one might actually ask what share of a receipt households actually
end up saving.
The bulk of the literature on intergenerational transfers and their impact on wealth inequality
dismiss these behavioral adjustments, even though it may well have immediate repercussions on
inequality [Wolff, 2002, 2015, Crawford and Hood, 2015, Bo¨nke et al., 2017]. Wolff and Gittleman
[2014] hypothesize for instance that poorer households are prone to save less out of or after
transfer receipt than richer households. They show that such heterogeneities might revert the
general finding that intergenerational transfers tend to equalize wealth. The authors nonetheless
only present hypothetical evidence from plausible, albeit empirically not founded heterogeneities
in the savings behavior across the wealth distribution. Their main analysis of the impact of
transfers on wealth inequality bases on a decomposition approach which neglects the behavioral
adjustment and assumes that households save 100 % of their transfers. Karagiannaki [2015] even
presents some important, albeit weak, empirical evidence that the savings behavior in fact varies
1I summarize inheritances and gifts as intergenerational transfers. The SOEP data from 2001 include the
source of these transfers and show that individuals typically receive gifts and inheritances, as one would expect,
from their parents (roughly 70 %, all transfers included). Less than 5 % from e.g. spouses, which would actually
not qualify as intergenerational transfer. As the source of transfers is not reported after 2001, I ignore the fact
that transfers are partly intragenerational.
2Wealth in this study always refers to the concept of net wealth calculated as the sum of all assets minus all
liabilities of a given household.
3Similar evidence is provided by Bo et al. [2015], Garbinti and Georges-Kot [2016], and for Germany by Doorley
and Pestel [2016] and Crusius and von Werder [2017].
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over the wealth distribution. While this alone is a step forward, the results are potentially biased
(see discussion below). Karagiannaki does also not show how such heterogeneities might affect
wealth inequality. Lastly, the studies of Elinder et al. [2016] and Boserup et al. [2016] resort to
tools of treatment analysis in order to evaluate the effect of transfers on wealth inequality. Their
studies implicitly control for (potential heterogeneities in) the savings behavior of households.
The result that transfers equalize wealth persists, they however do not explicitly estimate the
savings behavior and thus do not quantify nor illustrate the effect of transfers on the savings
behavior.
The present paper aims at contributing to the literature in a twofold way: First, I provide
causal estimates of how transfer receipt affects the savings behavior of households. The un-
derlying model allows for dynamic adjustment and, in a second step, also for variations in the
savings behavior over the lagged wealth distribution. The estimates reach beyond previous at-
tempts to estimate the effects of receipt on the savings behavior as undertaken by Wolff [2015]
and Karagiannaki [2015] by allowing for time constant heterogeneity and by instrumenting the
wealth endowment of the household in the period of receipt. Secondly, I provide a simulation
of how the estimated variations in the savings behavior contribute to the inequality effect of
intergenerational transfers. Using a tobit model, I estimate the transfer incidence and am able
to decompose the overall effect of transfer wealth on wealth inequality:
I suggest to decompose the overall effect of intergenerational transfers on wealth inequality
in three subordinated effects: First, the effect of the total transfer volume that determines the
relation of accruing transfers to the given wealth endowment of households. Second, the effect of
the transfer incidence, which describes that inheritances do not accrue randomly over the wealth
distribution, but that (1) transfer accrual, i.e. P (B > 0), and (2) transfer size, i.e. E(B|B > 0),
depend on the net-of-transfer wealth.4 Third, the effect resulting from the savings behavior of
households out of their transfer receipts. Households may differ considerably in the capacity to
transform transfer wealth in their regular stock of household wealth.
The results of my study are as follows: Estimating the average savings behavior out of trans-
fers with granting more attention to potential endogeneity issues leads to substantially smaller
estimates than presented by previous studies. On average and ceteris paribus, households tend
to save only 60 Cents of an inherited Euro5 (conditional on receipt, not controlling for whether
transfer is expected) within a two years period after receipt. At the same time, households do
not show a further significant dynamic adjustment. In contrast to the considerations of Wolff
and Gittleman [2014] and the results of Karagiannaki [2015], I do not find systematic differences
in the savings behavior out of transfers over the wealth distribution. The observed differences
do also not necessarily suggest that richer households tend to save more out of transfers than
poorer households. Not surprisingly, the corresponding simulation then also does not allow to
infer that the effect of transfer receipt on the savings behavior itself has an disequalizing effect.
4Throughout the paper I will refer to net-of-transfer wealth as net wealth.
5Note that this is equivalent to say, that households save their entire transfer but displace 40 Cents of savings
from other sources for each Euro inherited.
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This is even true when resorting to probably biased estimates of an OLS regression that would
suggest that richer households save most out of their transfers. Eventually the decomposition
exercise shows that the aggregated transfer volume effect takes such a progressive form that
even a strong transfer incidence and potentially regressive savings patterns do not qualify to
overturn the equalizing effect that intergenerational transfers have on the households net worth
distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
recent literature in the study of intergenerational transfers. Section 3 introduces the reader to
the statistical concepts shaping the distributional effect of transfers on wealth. Section 4 derives
and discusses the econometric approach for estimating the savings effect of transfer receipt while
section 5 gives a brief introduction in the data structure. Section 6 provides the corresponding
descriptive statistics and leads to section 7, in which I present the results for the estimations and
simulation. Section 8 presents tests on the robustness of the estimation and section 9 concludes.
The appendix provides further details.
2 Literature
The question of how intergenerational transfers affect inequality in the net wealth distribution
is cumbersome and has found different types of responses in the literature. I will here provide a
brief overview of some:
• The most long-standing discussion related to this matter is probably the one between Kot-
likoff and Summers [1981], Kotlikoff [1988] and Modigliani [1986, 1988] about the share of
inherited wealth in total wealth. Kotlikoff and Modiglina primarily disagreed on whether
returns to transfers shall be counted as transfer wealth or as saving effort of the individual:
Modigliani related un-capitalized transfers to observed wealth and obtained much lower
estimates of transfer wealth in aggregated wealth than Kotlikoff who attributed returns to
inherited wealth fully to inherited wealth. The discussion was rather recently revived by
Piketty et al. [2014]: The authors suggested to basically use capitalized transfer amounts
while limiting the value of capitalized transfers at maximum to the observed wealth of
individuals. Individuals are counted as heirs when their observed household wealth was at
most as much as the capitalized inheritance value. The corresponding share of transfers
in wealth thus amounts to 100 %. Individuals whose capitalized transfers do not exceed
observed wealth, are counted as savers (with a respective share of x % inherited wealth).
This approach bears the clear advantage that the share of inherited wealth cannot exceed
observed wealth while taking into account the returns to inherited wealth. Hence, ? base
their argument directly on the inter-temporal budget constraint of individuals. Bo¨nke et al.
[2015] applied the Piketty-approach to Germany and found that roughly 1/3 of household
wealth is attributable to intergenerational transfers. The main beneficiaries of intergen-
erational transfers, the paper reveals, is the upper middle class, where the proportion of
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inherited wealth is highest on average.
This approach certainly improves the understanding of intergenerational transfers in cur-
rent wealth statistics and provides an interesting distinction between savers and heirs. It is
also helpful in putting receipts into perspective that have accrued long ago (a disadvantage
of the approach presented in this paper, which I will discuss in more detail in section 5).
The approach by Piketty et al. [2014] does however base on hypothetical relations as it
does not take into account how much of a transfer an individual actually had saved over
time. It thereby only implicitly covers the behavioral reactions of individuals to transfer
receipt and provides, in turn, rather a point of reference (of how much an individual could
have saved out of a transfer if it had not consumed) rather than a solid estimate of how
transfers de facto affect the wealth accumulation of individuals.
• Another branch in the literature attempts to retrace the distributional effect of transfers
on the inequality in household wealth by primarily using a decomposition approach that
has been suggested and applied by Edward Wolff to American data sources [Wolff, 2002,
Wolff and Gittleman, 2014, Wolff, 2015], by Bo¨nke et al. [2017] to multiple Euro-countries
and by Karagiannaki [2015] to British data. The approach applies the decomposition of
the variance to the coefficient of variation (CV), which is a commonly used inequality mea-
sure for wealth data. The inequality in household wealth is then decomposed in inequality
loadings stemming from initial household wealth, transfer wealth and a term describing the
correlation of these wealth components. The decomposition illustrates typically that trans-
fer wealth correlates negatively with initial household wealth and thus causes a reduction
in the relative inequality of household wealth. Bo¨nke et al. [2017] provide decomposition
results for Germany that are fully in line with the findings in other applications of the
decomposition.
The decomposition by Wolff also serves as an interesting illustration of how transfer wealth
interacts with initial household wealth. The approach however crucially depends on the
assumption that households save the entire intergenerational transfer. Wolff and Gittleman
[2014] discuss this shortcoming in detail and raise concerns that differing saving patterns
over the wealth distribution might severely bias the results of the decomposition. The
present paper takes these concerns up and seeks to estimate, whether such a variation in
the marginal propensity to consume across the wealth distribution exists and is suited to
challenge the results of the above cited papers.
• A third approach in the literature uses regression analysis in order to tackle the main
weakness of the previously mentioned approaches: How much of a transfer do households
actually save or consume, respectively? The literature in this branch is diverse6, I will
here mainly refer to four papers: Elinder et al. [2016] and Boserup et al. [2016] analyze
6Several papers seek to estimate labor market reactions after transfer receipts: Elinder et al. [2012], Brown
et al. [2010], Bo et al. [2015], Crusius and von Werder [2017], doorley2016
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inheritance receipts in a in an event study framework. The former e.g. defines the totality of
heirs in year t as heir cohort t. The authors can show that the inequality in wealth in cohort
t decreases substantially compared to the inequality in the cohort t+ 1, which is only soon
to inherit. The approach has the merit that results are likely to be correct as long as saving
behaviors do not differ between cohorts. The impressive database underlying this study
contains information on all bequests of Swedes dying between 2002 and 2004 and their heirs.
It however does not encompass wealth information of the full Swedish population, it is thus
hard to generalize the findings of this study. The finding that transfers tend to equalize
wealth inequality thus seems to be robust against saving patterns. The treatment-based
analysis however still misses to quantify saving behaviors, a shortcoming accommodated
by the last two papers briefly mentioned in this literature review:
Karagiannaki [2015] and Maury Gittleman in Wolff [2015] provide estimates of regressing
household savings (defined as difference between household net wealth in two periods, i.e.
Wt−Wt−1) on transfers and controls. The resulting (linear) estimate illustrates how many
cents a household saved, on average, from an inherited Dollar. Gittleman estimates that
households save between 80 and 90 Cents of an inherited Dollar.7 While the author controls
for a number of possibly related factors, the results are potentially biased. For example,
time-constant omitted variables like the parental background can matter as they are likely
to relate the size of the inheritance and the wealth accumulation behavior of the individual.
Thrifty parents pass on particularly high transfers to their similarly thrifty, and thereby
richer, children. The estimate of interest would be upwards biased. The estimation also falls
short of testing the hypothesis of Wolff and Gittleman [2014] as it does not allow the saving
coefficient to vary over the wealth distribution. The paper by Karagiannaki [2015] contains
the estimation of a very similar model and comprises two approaches used to test whether
the saving out of transfers varies over the distribution: The quantile regression estimates
suggest that households in upper parts of the conditional savings distribution tend to save
more. This finding is however not directly illustrative for the question whether households
vary in their savings behavior over the unconditional wealth distribution. The author thus
interacts a dummy indicating the wealth quintile in the previous period of the respective
household with the inheritance amount. She concludes that the propensity to save from
the transfers “decreases (...) with initial wealth”, although differences in estimates are
not significant across quintiles. The results are interesting and seem to partly confirm the
hypothesis of Wolff and Gittleman [2014]. The estimation however is likely to suffer from
the same omitted variable bias as the one in Wolff [2015]. Moreover, interacting the dummy
indicators is likely to introduce an endogeneity issue in a regression of savings: While the
dummies convey information from the lagged wealth distribution, the dependent variable
also includes lagged wealth. As the reader will see below, this paper resorts to a similar
7The authors use the PSID for this estimation. Wealth is observed in 5 year intervals, so that the consump-
tion/saving estimate from transfers reflects the behavior on, supposedly, 2.5 years.
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empirical approach as Karagiannaki, but attempts to apply a more suitable identification
strategy.
The above presented three branches of literature are the major references for this paper: It seeks
to provide a causal estimate of the propensity to save out of transfers in a fashion similar to
e.g. Karagiannaki [2015]. It also tries to track down the distributional implications as done in
the contribution by Elinder et al. [2016]. The literature has however brought along some further
contributions: Westerheide [2005] regresses wealth on transfers and some controls using the same
data set as the present paper. The regression however lacks control variables as age and seems
to interpret wealth transfers as stocks.
3 The distributional effect of transfers
The literature consistently suggests that intergenerational transfers tend to equalize the inequal-
ity in household wealth.8 Transfers will reduce the inequality in household net wealth if the
following condition holds:(











where τ denotes the respective quantile of the lagged wealth distribution. Transfers will tend
to equalize the wealth distribution as long as the expected transfer in this quantile, defined as
the probability P (BH,t > 0) to receive times the average receipt E(BH,t|BH,t > 0) relative to
the wealth quantiles’ mean wealth, is higher for households from lower wealth quantiles. Or,
measured in initial wealth, expected transfers are typically higher for poorer households than
for richer households.9 Under this condition, the share of wealth hold by poorer households will
increase through transfer receipt. The effect will maintain as long as
P (BH,t > 0)× E(BH,t|BH,t > 0)τ=s
P (BH,t > 0)× E(BH,t|BH,t > 0)τ<s <
E(WnetH,t−1)τ=s
E(WnetH,t−1)τ<s
Hence, when the ratio of expected transfers between rich and poor is smaller than the ratio of net
wealth between rich and poor. The effect that intergenerational transfers have on the inequality
in household wealth can apparently be decomposed. I suggest to decompose it into the following
sub-effects:
• Aggregated transfer volume: Given the observed lagged wealth distribution, the ag-
gregated transfer volume (aggregated over all quantiles) is the first channel determining
8At this stage measures of absolute inequality are neglected, which typically indicate higher inequality after
transfer accrual.
9Relative transfers in the literature are expressed in lagged [Karagiannaki, 2015] or net-of-transfer [Kohli et al.,
2006] wealth distributions. I here resort to the lagged distribution.
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the relation between households’ transfers and their wealth: 10 The higher the aggregated
transfer volume, the potentially stronger can the inequality effect of transfers be. In order
to illustrate this channel, I will generate a contrafactual wealth distribution after transfer
receipt and distribute equal absolute shares of the aggregated transfer sum to the quantiles
of the wealth distribution. The inequality effect of the aggregated transfer volume will thus
be mechanically equalizing as poorer households will receive relatively higher transfers than
richer households. The rationale here is that this counterfactual illustrates the equalizing
potential of the aggregated transfer volume, i.e. the equalizing effect this sum of transfers
could take if it would basically be randomly distributed over the lagged wealth distribution.
Section 7.4 explains in more detail how these equal shares of transfers are generated.
• Incidence: Bequests do however typically not accrue randomly over the wealth distri-
bution, but rather accrue more often and with higher amounts the higher the position of
the receiving household in the lagged wealth distribution [Karagiannaki, 2015, Wolff and
Gittleman, 2014, Kohli et al., 2006]. Hence, a larger share of aggregated bequests accrues
to the advantage of richer households. I denote this leaning of the unconditional expected
value of transfers the transfer incidence and consider it particularly interesting: The trans-
fer incidence indicates the intergenerational wealth immobility between dynasties. This is
the channel through which dynasties’ capacities to perpetuate their class materializes. In
other words, the transfer incidence represents the intergenerational relationship of wealth
within dynasties beyond the observed monetary transfer. It is basically the channel illus-
trating the unobserved link in wealth between generations of the same dynasty (as heirs’
net-of-transfer wealth correlates with the testators’ wealth, represented by the observed
transfer). It might encompass effects from different dimensions, e.g. previous parental
investments in the human capital of their children, access to parental networks, valuable
habits and values and the impact of genes [Adermon et al., 2016, Black et al., 2015].11
• Savings behavior: Lastly, one has to take into account the behavioral adjustment of
receiving households. Transfer receipt is likely to affect the savings behavior - which can
either be understood as saving out of the transfer itself or as displacing other savings. These
economic reactions may well differ across the wealth distribution: More aﬄuent households
may have a lower propensity to consume out of transfers. Richer households may also
acquire higher returns to their investments, as has been discussed in the literature [Bo¨nke
et al., 2015, Piketty, 2014]. The results presented by Karagiannaki [2015] suggest that
10This paper basically resorts to three periods of aggregated transfers over a total period of 15 years. While
studies by e.g. Piketty and Zucman [2015] suggest increasing aggregate bequest flows, I will neglect this factor
and will pool wealth and inheritances over time for the distributional analysis. The aggregated transfer volume
effect is expected to be stronger, the bigger the inherited wealth is in relation to household wealth.
11Perhaps using the metaphor of a regression analysis helps to clarify this point: The economic status of the
children depends on a number of here unobserved factors and observed monetary intergenerational transfers. The
incidence effect reflects the average effect of all unobserved factors, i.e. the constant in a regression model. The
effect of the transfers itself is controlled for, in the sense that we identify the incidence effect before transfers
impact the childrens wealth level.
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systematic variations along the wealth distribution in the capacity to save out of transfers
are conceivable. Wolff and Gittleman [2014] discuss that such heterogeneities can overturn
the equalizing effect of transfers on the wealth distribution. The relevant quantity for
retracing the distributional impact of intergenerational transfers on the wealth distribution
would then no longer be BHt, as in eq. 3.1, but rather the saved share
12
BsavedH,t = βτ ×BH,t.
In section 4 a more detailed explanation of the βτ estimate will follow. For the moment
it is crucial that it captures the economic reaction of households to the transfer amount
with βτ > 0. If 0 < β < 1 estimates relying on the logic of inequality 3.1 may be biased:
Obviously, BsavedH,t < BH,t
13, whereas variations of β over the wealth distribution further
bias the analysis. Additionally, some papers derive Wnet = Wht − Bht and, by implicitly
assuming that β = 1, are overestimating household wealth net of transfers.
Hence, intergenerational transfers can easily take a progressive or a regressive effect. While the
sheer volume of transfers has no immediate distributional implication, the transfer incidence can
develop either a progressive or regressive effect, depending wholly on the correlation of transfer
size and household wealth. Assuming that poorer households save less out of transfers than
richer households, this effect would rather take a regressive impact on wealth inequality.
4 Methodology
At the core of the analysis in this paper is the estimation of the share that households typically
save from received intergenerational transfers. This share is denoted β. In what follows, first the
estimation of the average β is derived, thereafter the procedure of how to consistently estimate
variations of β over the wealth distribution.
4.1 Average effect
Estimating the average saving from intergenerational transfers, starts with assuming a data
generating process of the following form:
WH,t = αH + β1BH,t + β2B
D
H,t + γWH,t−1 + δ1IH,t + δ2AH,t + H,t (4.1)
Equation 4.1 describes the level formulation of the model: Current household wealth WH,t is a
function of intergenerational transfers, household income IH,t, household wealth in the preceding
12Apparently this would also require representing βτ in equation 3.1 above. I abstain from doing so for the
sake of clearity.
13Note, that β > 1 is also conceivable. For instance, of households save the entire transfer and earn returns to
their capital. Estimates of β however typically yield values of β < 1.
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period, WH,t−1 and age as control variable.14 Transfers are modeled by BDH,t,
15 which is a dummy
indicating bequest receipt, and BH,t which denotes the linear bequest amount.
16 αH is a time-
constant individual effect, H,t is the common white noise error term.
17
β is the parameter of interest in this specification and captures the economic response of the
household to a transfer receipt. If β < 1, households on average tend to consume a share 1− β
(in the short term)18 from the transfer amount.19 If β > 1, households’ wealth increases by more
than the transfer amount, which is well possible, when re-investments bear immediate returns.
Note too, that WH,t contains, as it is common in the literature, the observed values, i.e. including
transfers. This way, the coefficient measures the propensity to save from transfers. Deducting
transfers from WH,t, i.e. regressing the net-of-transfer wealth, would yield a coefficient measuring
the displacement of other wealth components through transfers. For example, if transfers cause
households to save less from other sources (e.g. income) in face of the transfer, then βWH,t−BH,t
would quantify this effect. The estimates are however fully exchangeable in that the here used
coefficient β = βWH,t−BH,t + 1.
As intergenerational transfers are considered a flow, Wt−1 is subtracted from both sides of
equation 4.1 yielding
SH,t = αH + β1BH,t + β2B
D
H,t + (γ − 1)WH,t−1 + δKCH,t,K + H,t (4.2)
where the dependent variable now is the flow20 SH,t = WH,t−WH,t−1 and C contains polynomials
of age and household income and interactions of the two. Rewriting γ − 1 = ρ and taking first
differences in order to eliminate the individual effect, leads to
∆SH,t = β1∆BH,t + β2∆B
D
H,t + ρ∆WH,t−1 + δk∆CH,t,K + ∆H,t. (4.3)
The underlying assumption that ∆BH,t is exogenous given the elimination of the individual effect
αH is further discussed below in section 4.3. The dynamic structure of this model however makes
14Further control variables (e.g. being self-employed or retired) have been tested but do not impact the condi-
tional savings behavior significantly.
15BDH,t equals 1 only in the period of receipt.
16Transfers are thus modeled as interaction of the transfer amount BH,t and the receipt indicator B
D
H,t. Zero
receipts are thus included.
17Using panel data, we might encounter correlations between households’ error terms. I thus use cluster-robust
standard errors in all specifications.
18Recall that dynamic specifications allow to derive the long term effect as βlong = β/(1 − γ), where γ = 0
implies βlong = β.
19Note, that it is unclear whether households consume out of the transfer itself or whether transfers displace
other savings. For the distributional effect of transfers however, this distinction does not matter.
20Note that the data set only provides 3 periods of wealth observations. Hence, writing equation 4.1 with a flow
as dependent variable and adding a lagged dependent variable, which would perhaps be a more common dynamic
specification, would not leave a further lag as needed as instrument.
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estimating equation 4.3 prone to being biased due to a correlation between ∆WH,t−1 and ∆H,t:
∆WH,t−1 = WH,t−1 −WH,t−2 (4.4)
∆H,t = H,t − H,t−1 (4.5)
In order to circumvent endogeneity issues, ∆WH,t−1 is instrumented by the level value WH,t−2.
The second-stage regression equation is thus represented by
∆SH,t = β1∆BH,t + β2∆B
D
H,t + ρ∆WˆH,t−1 + δk∆CH,t,k + ∆H,t (4.6)
where ∆WˆH,t−1 is predicted from the first-stage regression
∆WˆH,t−1 = ξˆWH,t−2 + θˆ1∆BH,t + θˆ2∆BDH,t + ηˆk∆CH,t,k (4.7)
where ∆νH,t is assumed to be a white noise error term.
Note that the model simplifies considerably in case there are no dynamic effects, i.e. γ = 1
and no significant impact is coming from controlling for lagged wealth. The ρ estimate from
equation 4.6 then would be close to −1, reflecting the subtracted WH,t−1. Reformulating the
level equation 4.1 then yields the level equation:
SH,t = αH + β1BH,t + β2B
D
H,t + δKCH,t + H,t (4.8)
Here, the lagged wealth term on the right hand side of model 4.1 simply drops. The corresponding
specification in differences is:
∆SH,t = β1∆BH,t + β2∆B
D
H,t + δk∆CH,t,k + ∆H,t (4.9)
4.2 Heterogeneity in the saving effect
Karagiannaki [2015] finds some evidence for variation in β over the wealth distribution. Equation
4.6 is thus slightly extended:









β6+q−1∆(BDH,t ×W q−1H,t−1) + ρ∆WˆH,t−1 + δk∆CH,t,k + ∆H,t (4.10)
Where W q−1H,t−1 is a dummy set of q−1 = 4 quantile indicators, indicating in which wealth quintile
the household has been located in the previous periods’ wealth distribution. These dummy
variables are obviously also endogeneous and are thus instrumented with (∆BH,t)×W qH,t−2. As
the reader will notice below, further variations of equation 4.6 and 4.10 will be estimated.
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4.3 Exogeneity of Transfers
The consistency of the regression results hinges on the assumption that transfers are exogenous.
I want to briefly state, why I consider this assumption plausible:
• Gifts: Intergenerational transfers include gifts. While it is conceivable that many inheri-
tances accrue accidentally [Dynan et al., 2002], inter vivo transfers could occur primarily
on purpose: If for instance households in need are more likely to receive gifts, then the β
coefficient would be biased downwards. I will provide descriptive evidence whether such
concerns seem warranted. Similarly, if gifts have accrued earlier, household wealth will be
higher while actual inheritances will be lower. Most specifications therefore include wt−1
as control variable. Other specifications rely on using fixed effects in order to control for
the impact of such earlier transfers. Lastly, I will also provide robustness tests excluding
gifts.
• Reverse causality: The just mentioned issue is a variety of a potentially more general
reverse causality problem. As it was mentioned in section 3, transfer accrual and size is
partly a function of household wealth. This relationship could introduce a simultaneity
issue w.r.t. β in eq. 4.1. I argue however, that the relationship is attributable to family
characteristics whose impact vanishes in the fixed effects specifications. Most estimations
also use savings as dependent variable for which the reverse causality issue seems to be less
evident.
• Previous inheritances: In section 5 I will discuss in detail what transfers we are able to
observe. Note however already, that the present study only resorts to inheritances received
after 1998, dismissing most of the retrospectively observed transfer data.21The data set
in use does not provide consistent wealth data for the transfer observations before 1998.
Using fixed effects estimations, however, the previous transfer accruals should play no role.
5 Data
The analysis is based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which is a longitudinal
panel study from Germany covering roughly 11.000 households each year. The data contains
information on wealth stocks on the individual and household level for the survey waves of 2002,
2007 and 2012. Wealth covers real estate holdings, financial wealth (savings, stocks and shares,
any type of private insurance based wealth22), company assets, tangible assets and any kind of
debts. This study resorts to the net wealth, as calculated by the SOEP by subtracting liabilities
21Westerheide [2005] uses all retrospectively observed inheritances: To do so, he assumes that inheritances are
fully saved and capitalizes them over the period between receipt and period of wealth observation. Considering
that inheritances partly accrued many years ago (and values thus grow high), this approach introduces a high
degree of uncertainty.
22The data does not cover claims against public insurances as e.g. public pensions. At the end of this section
I briefly discuss this issue.
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from assets. As thoroughly discussed in the literature, surveys on wealth commonly suffer from
non-random item non-response issues. In order to accommodate such problems, the wealth data
in the SOEP is edited and imputed with 5 implicates.23
Inheritances and gifts are systematically surveyed in the SOEP since 2001 when the SOEP
contained an extended module about inheritances. This module enquired households about (up
to three) transfer receipts in the past and present. Only for the 2001 wave, however, the source,
the recipient within the household and the nature of the transfers were surveyed. After 2001 the
SOEP covers intergenerational transfers only on the household level and records the value24 and
type of the transfer. According to the SOEP, the inheritance values are net of taxes.25
Despite the commonly acknowledged high quality of SOEP data, some concerns remain:
Vermeulen [2014] shows that even imputations and weighting strategies might fail in representing
the top 1 % of the wealth distribution.26 In the same way, non-random item non-response issues
may also occur in the inheritance data where the remedy of imputations is lacking.27
The data availability requires some aggregation: Transfer data are aggregated over the 4 years
prior to and the year in which wealth was observed, i.e. in 2002, 2007 and 2012 respectively. As
transfers are only observed on the household level, the analysis uses the respective wealth data on
the household level.28 This yields a data set with 3 time periods containing the households net
worth and the aggregated intergenerational transfers spanning from 1998 to 2012. All amounts
are expressed in Euro prices of 2010.
Some conceptual issues remain with the given data set that are worth being discussed briefly:
• Expectations: Ideally, the analysis here would control for expectations regarding future
transfer receipts as households are theoretically expected to adjust their behavior accord-
ingly. The SOEP surveyed expectations in 2001: Respondents stated how likely they per-
ceived to receive a transfer in the (not further specified) future29 and whether the expected
transfer will be below 50.000 DM (≈ 25.000 Euro) or above. After all, the expectations
data is likely to be very noisy. Also, being only surveyed in 2001, no corresponding infor-
23The SOEP imputation strategy is documented e.g. in Frick et al. [2010]. I follow the procedures suggested by
Rubin [1987] for adjusting standard errors and for calculating point estimates in imputed data sets. Specifically,
I resort to the Stata environment for imputed data and, if necessary, apply the procedures by hand.
24Until 2004 the SOEP only covered transfers above 2500 Euro, since then all transfers above 500 Euro are
allegedly reported.
25Due to high allowances and exemptions for e.g. business capital, most intergenerational transfers are not
taxed anyway. See Braun [2015] for an estimate of the efficient tax rate and Bach and Thiemann [2016] and Bach
and Mertz [2016] for an evaluation of the German inheritance and gift tax statistics.
26Further work on the full depiction of household wealth dealing with non-observation bias and differential
non-response bias is provided by e.g. Eckerstorfer et al. [2015], or with special focus on Germany by Westermeier
[2016].
27While the PHF data may be more accurate in terms of wealth [Bartels and Bo¨nke, 2015], they are only
available for two waves and would thus restrict the scope of the analysis severely and are, taking Vermeulen
[2014] as benchmark, still understating the top wealth. Access to the inheritance and gift statistics data is slowly
liberalized but represents only an upper part of the inheritance distribution. See otherwise Bartels and Bo¨nke
[2015] for an overview of the available wealth data sets from Germany.
28Where individual information are needed in the analysis (e.g. age information), I resort to the characteristics
of the household head.
29Respondents could reply by “No”, “Don’t know”, “Yes, that is likely”, “Yes, that is certain”
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mation is available for transfers received between 1998 and 2001. Also, it is questionable
whether the reported expectations bear still instructive information for transfers received
up to 10 years after expectations had been stated. I therefore ignore the information on
expectations in the main analysis and will resume the topic in section 8 in detail.30
• Wealth type of transfer: Westerheide [2005] uses the SOEP wave of 2001 in order to
estimate a similar model as the one that will be estimated in this paper and shows that
the wealth type of a transfer affects the consumption behavior out of intergenerational
transfers. In line with what one would expect, consumption out of real estate and business
capital seems to be less pronounced than out of more liquid wealth types. After 2001
wealth types of transfers are however not recorded anymore and will enter my estimation
as an omitted variable.
• Retirement wealth: The SOEP wealth data does not yet contain information about
public pension claims. While the wealth stocks we observe might e.g. well contain the old
age provision of self-employed, many employees will have mainly saved for retirement by
the statutory pension scheme. Hence, taking into account such claims would reduce wealth
inequality strongly as shown by Bo¨nke et al. [2016]. It is nonetheless disputable whether
pension claims should be taken into account even if it would be possible: In contrast to
the wealth so far reported in the SOEP, pension claims are not fungible and thereby lack
a crucial criterion of what is typically rated as wealth.
• Non-monetary transfers: Wealth might well be transmitted over generations by other
means than monetary transfer.31 Parents, for instance, might invest strongly in the hu-
man capital of their children which might affect children’s wealth and future monetary
transfers at the same time. Such transfers are not observed but seem to be unlikely to
bias the estimations results here: First, the estimation technique presented in 4 allows for
time constant heterogeneity. Second, I control for household earnings which is the most
obvious channel between parental investments in human capital and the ability to acquire
wealth. Not observing such transfers however might translate in a misleading result of the
simulation in section 7.4 underestimating the degree to which intergenerational transfers
shape the wealth distribution. I will resume the discussion of this point in the conclusions.
• Previous intergenerational transfers: In fact, the SOEP does report inheritances in
retrospect, thereby covering theoretically all transfers ever received by a household. I
am however not using such information if the accrual was before 1998 as corresponding
30Doorley and Pestel [2016] also use the SOEP expectations for a study of the effect of wealth shocks on the
intensive margin of labor supply. Brown et al. [2010] and also Crusius and von Werder [2017] resort to data sets
with more detailed information on expectations about future transfers and analyze the impact of transfers with
respect to the extensive margin of labor supply. The results in this literature appear nonetheless fuzzy and do
not fully reflect the behavioral reactions that economic theory would predict.
31The point here of course also holds for unobserved prior concessions that children might provide to their
parents for receiving transfers. Strategic bequest motives are for instance discussed in Cremer and Pestieau
[2009].
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observations on wealth are lacking. Note, however, that households of course can receive
inheritances more than once, as inheritances must not exclusively occur from parents (and
even if they did, the analysis on the household level permits multiple inheritances). Hence,
even when households have received transfers before 1998 they still can receive further
transfers.32
6 Descriptive Statistics
This section introduces to the characteristics of the sample underlying the analysis. Table 1 and
2 provide summary statistics for intergenerational transfers and household wealth, respectively.
Note that the tables break down summary statistics to the three time periods, the analysis
is based on. Hence, numbers referring to e.g. 2002 reflect the respective statistic of those
transfers observed between 1998 and 2002. Table 3 then introduces in the analysis by descriptively
depicting the statistical relationship between transfers and wealth over the wealth distribution.
6.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 summarizes some statistics about intergenerational transfers. Panel a for instance shows
that the mean transfer, including inheritances and gifts, varies around 70.000 Euro (conditional
on transfer receipt) over the three time periods. Panel b then captures the distribution of
intergenerational transfers, suggesting that the median transfer is much lower than the mean,
equaling roughly 17.000 Euro over all transfers. Panel c gives the absolute number of observed
transfer incidents, distinguishing between inheritances and inter vivo transfers: In total, the
analysis is based on 2142 cases. Relating to the absolute number of observations, less than 10 %
of the households report to have received a transfer over these 15 years.33 Interestingly, almost
half of the observed incidents are actually gifts. The share of recipients seems to slightly increase
over time. While this would be in line with expectations concerning inheritance flows, the small
increases here are probably not significantly different from each other.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics of the households’ net wealth over time. Panel
a shows that average wealth is around 155.000 Euro. The median is well below that, revolving
around 50.000 Euro. Panel b reports the mean wealth over quintiles.34 Note that a signifi-
cant share of the sample is indebted, meaning that average wealth for the poorest 20 % of the
population is negative. Table 12 in the appendix reports on the wealth composition over time.
32Westerheide [2005] attempts to consider all reported transfers, no matter how long ago they have accrued.
Typically, results will then crucially depend on the capitalization rate applied to older receipts.
33Note that this does not include the intergenerational transfers that accrued before 1998.
34Table 11 in the appendix includes the cut-off points for the wealth quintiles used in the main analysis.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics intergenerational transfers (in Euro):
2002 2007 2012 Total
Panel a. Summary (conditional on receipt)
Mean 81,957 61,114 83,205 75,491
Std. Deviation 153,574 131,008 195,580 168,641
Min 151 520 480 151
Max 1,789,820 1,502,987 2,523,150 2,523,150
Panel b. Distribution of transfers (conditional on receipt)
p10 5,643 3,122 1,970 2,699
p25 9,076 6,292 6,152 7,159
p50 28,570 15,994 16,843 16,930
p75 93,835 52,029 48,584 56,433
p90 203,160 175,843 233,195 192,123
Panel c. Transfer receipts
Cases 587 874 681 2142
Share recipients 0.059 0.098 0.119 0.094
Inter vivos (thereof) 258 440 366 1064
Share (thereof) 0.405 0.515 0.522 0.497
SOEPv30, own calculations. Data is weighted using longitudinal
weights. Sample restricted to estimation sample.
6.2 Transfers accrual over the wealth distribution
Table 3 touches on the relationship between transfers and wealth. Panel a column 1 for instance,
reports the number of observed transfer receipts over wealth quintiles from the preceding pe-
riod, column 2 adds the share of recipients. Both indicators tend to increase over the wealth
distribution, reflecting that it is more likely to receive a wealth transfer, the richer the household
initially is. The mean transfer amount, as reported in column 3, indicates somewhat of a u-shape,
showing high receipts for households from the bottom quintile of the wealth distribution. Mean
transfers for the succeeding 20 % of the population are at first lower, but increase monotonically
over the rest of the net wealth distribution.
Column 5 includes the key statistic in the analysis of the distributional effect of wealth
transfers, that was introduced in inequality 3.1, the relative transfer size. In fact, the relative
transfer size tends to decrease over the wealth distribution, which entails that the relation of
transfer sizes and wealth stocks tends to yield an equalizing effect of intergenerational transfers.
This pattern is commonly found in the literature: Wolff and Gittleman [2014] (table 3) and
Karagiannaki [2015] (table 6) find the same relationship. Decreasing relative transfers over the
wealth distribution imply that the wealth share of poorer parts of the population is increasing
thus inequality is decreasing.35
There are however some reasons why the ratios in the last column of panel a in table 3 appear
somewhat huge and jumpy: First, as noted in the table, the quintiles originate from t− 1, thus
relating the aggregated transfers of the last 5 years to wealth as observed 5 years ago. Quintile
35Note, again, that the absolute difference in wealth is typically increasing through transfers. Which is also
documented by Wolff and Gittleman [2014] and Karagiannaki [2015] in the respective tables.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics household net wealth (in Euro):
2002 2007 2012 Total
Panel a. Summary
mean 162,634.05 156,612.24 134,031.31 149,974.52
p50 44,920.99 51,729.87 46,718.35 47,647.99
sd 397,786.46 348,858.01 267,501.84 337,776.35
min -2,313,555.10 -1,510,926.13 -1,177,238.79 -2,648,154.88
max 12,799,097.00 8,964,804.50 9,855,908.00 12,920,548.40
Panel b. Mean wealth
Quintile 1 -8751.502 -10765.71 -11505.11 -10459.01
Quintile 2 7598.68 9063.165 7523.368 8085.435
Quintile 3 49602.53 55361.64 51179.69 52056.41
Quintile 4 173223.8 167042.3 156903.6 165101.1
Quintile 5 595256.5 563793.9 471665.8 538840.4
SOEPv30, own calculations. Data is weighted using longitudinal
weights. Sample restricted to estimation sample.
Table 3: Relationship of wealth and transfers (in Euro):
Cases Share of Mean Relative value1,3
recipients amount1 E(Bt/Wt−1)
Panel a. Transfers over wealth quintiles from Wt−1
Quintile 1 128 4.66 95,449 519.00
Quintile 2 214 7.88 43,208 477.20
Quintile 3 354 16.34 47,014 91.28
Quintile 4 363 13.55 52,831 32.18
Quintile 5 373 12.78 148,291 25.14
Panel b. Transfer receipts over age groups2
< 30 840 9.40 31,735 .
30-45 4,446 13.74 69,176 85.68
45-60 4,656 11.45 82,798 36.71
60-75 2,526 6.71 74,725 22.59
> 75 384 2.09 127,190 37.08
Panel c. Transfers over HH income quintiles
Quintile 1 1,056 3.74 36,197 35.76
Quintile 2 1,590 6.58 46,472 35.96
Quintile 3 2,064 8.40 108,683 62.49
Quintile 4 3,474 14.20 50,137 33.68
Quintile 5 4,350 16.92 99,527 37.35
SOEPv30, own calculations. Data is weighted using longitu-
dinal weights. Sample restricted to estimation sample.
1 Conditional on receipt.
2 Number reflects observed receipts in respective age group,
i.e. individuals receiving more than once count more than
once.
3 Number reflect the absolute values, thus, negative ratios for
the first wealth quintile appear as positive numbers. Values
in %.
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1 is furthermore obviously a heterogeneous group: As shown in table 2, the mean wealth of
this group is negative, encompassing all indebted households, irrespective of whether these are
systematically short of resources or just temporarily indebted due to e.g. investments in human
capital.
Panel b then presents the same indicators, albeit calculated across age groups. Age matters in
some respects: First, while heirs receive their inheritances typically in the mid 50s, the numerous
gift recipients in the sample are in their mid 40s (compare table 13 in the appendix). Second,
young recipients either receive gifts, which are typically lower than inheritances, or inherit from
young relatives, which then could not accumulate wealth over their entire life cycle. Consequently,
column 3 shows that the mean transfer amount increases over age groups. Thirdly, life cycle
theory predicts increasing wealth until retirement entry. This effect may contribute to the pattern
that relative transfers are particularly high for young recipients. The various interrelations of
age with both, wealth and transfers, seem to confirm earlier considerations to control for the
impact of age in the regression analysis.
Panel c gives the indicators over the current quintiles of the household income distribution.
While the mean amount as presented in column 3 do not indicate a systematic variation (con-
trasting somewhat the statistics provided by Wolff and Gittleman [2014]) over the income dis-
tribution, the probability to receive seems to be correlated positively with income levels. Again,
the summary statistics reflect the expected pattern and suggest to control for household income
in the estimation.
Considering the statistical relationships between wealth, transfers, age and income, the cor-
relation of wealth and intergenerational transfers might well be misleadingly overstated by the
results in table 3. In order to descriptively show whether there is a systematic incidence effect as
argued in section 3 , I will briefly present the estimation results of a tobit model regressing the
transfer amount on a dummy set indicating the households’ wealth quintile in t − 1 controlling
also for age and household income with third order polynomials. Using the McDonald and Moffit
[1980] decomposition in order to derive, first, the marginal effect on the intensive margin (i.e. the
amount received)36 and, second, the marginal effect on the extensive margin (i.e. the probability
to receive), I estimate the results in table 4:
Panel a reports the descriptive results for regressing all transfers. For instance, having been
in the 5th wealth quintile in the previous period increases the probability of households to receive
a transfer by 0.27 percentage points37 compared to household who have been in the 1st quintile.
Considering the unconditional probability to receive a transfer when having been in the bottom
20 % of 4.7 %, the estimate suggests an increase of the probability by almost 6 %. The second
36Formally, using dummy variables the effect on the intensive margin equals
Eq=i(y|y∗ > 0, x)]− Eq=1(y|y∗ > 0, x)
and on the extensive margin
Pq=i(y
∗ > 0)− Pq=0(y∗ > 0)
with i = (2, ..., 5)
37Evaluated at the means of the control variables and conditional on age and household income.
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Table 4: Tobit estimation of incidence effect (marginal effects displayed):
Basis 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st Quintile
Panel a: All transfers.
Extensive margin 0.0004 0.0022 0.0021 0.0027
se. 0.0168 0.0160 0.0164 0.0167
Intensive margin 8,429 45,775 44,514 57,519
se. 22,421 18,604 20,797 17,915
Overall effect 11,552 62,774 61,043 78,890
se. 30,736 25,504 28,514 24,559
Panel b: Inter vivos only.
Extensive margin 0.0007 0.0027 0.0025 0.0018
se. 0.0195 0.0187 0.0194 0.0202
Intensive margin 5,731 21,743 19,978 14,390
se. 2,977 201 836 691
Overall effect 7,843 29,768 27,350 19,697
se. 4,074 272 1,144 945
Age controls 3 3 3 3
Income controls 3 3 3 3
Table includes marginal effects from Tobit esti-
mations in which the transfer amount is regressed
on a dummy set indicating the households’ wealth
quintiles in the previous period and polynomials
of age and income.
SOEPv30, own calculations. Data is weighted.
row displays the effect on the intensive margin: Households, who have recently been in the
3rd wealth quintile are, conditional on receiving a transfer, likely to inherit a transfer that is
on average 45,700 Euro higher than a transfer received by households who were in the bottom
quintile. The third row of panel a then presents the overall difference between households coming
from different wealth quintiles. Panel b contains the same set of estimates, albeit resulting
from excluding inheritances from intergenerational transfers. Generally, the differences between
households from different quintiles seem less pronounced. The results in the extensive margin
of panel b then somewhat accommodate concerns, inter vivo transfers are predominantly needs-
driven. Even if there is such an effect, poor households are, conditional on age and household
income, far less likely to receive a transfer than more aﬄuent households. After all, the estimates
in table 4 suggest that there is an incidence effect in transfer receipts independent of age and
income effects: The richer households are, the higher is their probability to receive a transfer
and, conditional on receipt, the higher will this transfer be. Hence, the distributional analysis of
transfers w.r.t. to wealth inequality should take into account the heterogeneous transfer accrual.
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7 Results
At first, I will present the estimated average effects of transfer receipt on the household saving
behavior. Thereafter, the results of checking up on potential heterogeneities over the wealth
distribution are provided. I will then discuss in the last subsection whether these heterogeneities
translate into a disequalizing effect of transfers with regard to household wealth inequality.
7.1 Regression results: Average effect
Table 5 contains the results of regressing variations of the model derived in section 4.1. In
particular the OLS specification (eq. 4.2) whose results are presented in column 1 is comparable
to the estimations in Karagiannaki [2015] or by Maury Gittleman in Wolff [2015].38 The estimates
are read as follows: First, the transfer dummy is negative and highly significant implying that
only transfers beyond 30.000 Euro39 will typically raise heirs’ savings. The estimates for the
linear and squared transfer amount seem to suggest a non-linear relationship with a decreasing
slope. As noted above, the estimates require a joint interpretation: Conditional on receipt, the
OLS model implies an average marginal effect 7 758.77 Euro. Note that gifts and inheritances
are expressed in 10 000 Euro in all regressions. Hence, the estimates describe an increase in
transfers by 10 000 Euro. The average transfer in the sample equals roughly 75 500 Euro which,
according to these estimates, would entail an increase in savings by roughly 36 600 Euro. Just
as the joint significance of the three transfer variables, this effect is significant on the 1 % level.
Table 5: The average saving effect after transfer receipt:
Dep.: Savings OLS1 FD1 FD1 FD with IV1,2 FD with IV1,2
Amount 8712.12*** 5997.70*** 655.97 3074.80** 1760.27
(2313.22) (1814.32) (3793.31) (1532.32) (1792.13)
Amount squared -63.14*** 70.61* 17.42
(16.06) (36.36) (27.18)
Transfer Dummy -25568.60*** -10080.74 8968.42 -7315.82 -2619.10
(9436.01) (14106.40) (14028.51) (9564.40) (9173.46)
Wt−1 -1.06*** -1.06***
(0.16) (0.16)
Controls 3 3 3 3 3
Number of observations 10400 5200 5200 5200 5200
The table displays estimates of regressing savings on intergenerational transfers (specified by a
dummy indicating transfer receipt, the linear and partly the squared amount) and the households’
wealth in the previous period and further controls.
1 Control variables: All parameters are conditional on controlling for polynomials of age and household
income. Estimated with cluster robust standard errors. Complete estimation results are reported
in the appendix. Intergenerational transfers are expressed in 10.000 Euros.
2 First stage results reported in the appendix.
Estimations based on SOEP v30.
Looking at the publications using a resembling model, the results appear rather similar: Wolff
38Both other publications model transfers only linearly, though.
39The quadratic nature of the equation brings along a second zero: Transfers beyond 1 349 727.3 Euro will
entail a negative savings effect of transfers.
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[2015] lists estimates, which indicate that a 10 000 Dollar transfer causes savings to increase by
slightly above 8000 Dollar.40 The underlying PSID data also only surveyed wealth in 5 year
intervals, thus implying a similar distance between transfer receipt and observation of wealth.
Hence, the estimates are very much comparable to the one of the here estimated OLS model.
Karagiannaki [2015] uses the British household survey panel and compares estimates implying
an assumed average distance between receipt and wealth data point of 10 years. The estimates
are accordingly lower, taking 0.67 (mean) and 0.62 (median). In an back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lation she infers an average propensity to consume of 7.3 % per annum. Applying this logic to
the present estimates would yield a slightly higher average propensity to consume of 12 % per
annum.41
After all, the given kind of OLS model seems to consistently yield similar results. As argued
above, however, these estimates are likely to suffer from omitted variable biases. I thus present
further estimates, seeking to control for confounding factors. For the sake of comparability to
the literature and simplicity, the following models are reported with squared term and without
squared term. Column 2 of table 5 presents a first differenced variation of the model already
suggesting that the parameter of interest is upwards biased in the OLS estimation: The FD
estimate suggests that, conditional on receipt, slightly less than 2/3 of an inherited Euro are
saved. Column 3 adds a squared term to the previous model,which causes a sharp shift in the
shape of the effect: The transfer dummy turns positive, just as the squared term. The linear
term, however, decreases. The average marginal effect (conditional on receipt) equals 1 722 Euro.
This implies that the propensity to save is estimated to be tremendously low for small transfer
values, albeit increasing with transfer size (compare figure 1 below). While heirs, on average and
c.p., tend to save almost the entire first 10 000 Euro (i.e. 9 694 Euro), the average conditional
transfer of 75 500 Euro only entails an average increase in savings of 17 944 Euro. Note that the
three estimates are jointly significant on the 1 % level.
Following the reasoning of section 4, it however appears important to control for lagged
wealth when evaluating how transfers affect the savings behavior of households.42 Wolff [2015]
controls for wealth in his estimation linearly and Karagiannaki [2015] uses wealth quintiles from
the previous period, both not dealing with potential endogeneity issues rising from these control
variables. The estimates in column 4 (dummy and linear effect) and 5 (dummy, linear and squared
term) control for lagged wealth by instrumenting it as shown in equation 4.6.43 Naturally, using
40Wolff [2015] specifies transfers linearly, the marginal effect is thus constant.
41Since there is no strong temporal variation in the accrual of transfers, the average distance in the present
sample is expected to be (0+1+2+3+4)/5=2 years, where 0 means that people inherited in the year in which
wealth was also observed. Empirically, the average distance in the sample is 1.8 years on average. The estimated
average marginal effect given the average conditional transfer of 75 500 Euro equals .78 implying that 1− 0.78 =
22 % of an inherited Euro were consumed. Hence, 22/1.8=12.2 % per annum. Due to the inaccuracy in the
estimates, however, the present estimate for the marginal propensity to consume is not significantly different from
the one presented by Karagiannaki [2015].
42Note that once lagged wealth is controlled for, it does not matter anymore whether wealth or savings is
chosen as dependent variable. Except for the estimate of Wt−1, which will vary by 1, the estimates will remain
the same.
43Table 15 in the appendix provides the first stage results of this estimation.
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first differences and instrumental variable techniques reduces the accuracy of the estimation.44
Neither the estimates in column 4 (p-value of 0.1285), nor those in column 5 are jointly significant
on conventional levels. If anything, the estimates also rather speak for low saving rates from
transfers. Interestingly, however, the lagged wealth parameter is very close to −1. Recalling from
section 4 that the parameter γ as defined in equation 4.2 equals γ = ρ + 1 a Wald test reveals
that γ does not differ significantly from 0. Controlling for lagged wealth does thus not impact
the saving behavior out of transfers. Dropping lagged wealth as control variable then suggests
that the models of equation 4.9 with, first, dummy and linear term and, second, dummy, linear
and squared term respectively are consistent, the corresponding estimates in column (2) and (3)
useful. The two sets of estimates might look different at first sight, figure 1 suggests that they
actually behave rather similarly over the full range of transfers in the sample.45
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The main difference between the two is the difference in marginal effects: The model from
column (2) implies a constant and fairly plausible marginal effect. The model from column (3)
implies very low saving rates for low transfers and increasing, substantially higher saving rates
from high transfers. Such a shape seems plausible for sizable transfer, for most transfers in the
present sample, though, the saving rates appear rather low. After all, the model from column
(2) (which is depicted in equation 4.9) appears to be simpler to interpret and more illustrative
for the common transfer sizes in this sample.46 The two parameters are jointly significant on the
1 % level and predict that roughly half of the average transfer in the present sample is saved.
44Note that standard errors are clustered at the household level. Also, they take into account the additional
uncertainty due to multiple imputations.
45Note, that 99 % of the non-zero transfers in the given sample are below 1.000.000 Euro.
46In particular, the model with dummy, linear and squared term provides implausibly low saving rates for
transfers between 20.000 and 50.000 Euro which encompasses 75 % of all observed transfers.
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Transfers above 16 800 Euro on average and ceteris paribus will translate into increasing savings
of recipients. Households also tend to save 60 Cents of an inherited Euro once they receive a
transfer. The results presented in the literature are thus likely to be slightly upwards biased.
The main driver for this bias could simply be the family background: Richer parents foster the
wealth accumulation of their children (e.g. by investments in their human capital or by setting
an example of living an economical life) and bequeath higher transfers. Controlling for time
constant heterogeneity accommodates this flaw.
7.2 Regression results: effect heterogeneity
Nonetheless, non-linearities could conceal that lagged wealth still matters for the current savings
behavior of households out of transfers. The purpose of this sub-chapter is to test, whether
there is evidence for the hypothesis that richer households do save more from transfers than
poorer households. This presumption is often stated in the debate on the effect of intergenera-
tional transfers on wealth and in fact my have far-reaching implications for the distribution of
wealth. Table 6 presents a number of specifications using interactions of the households’ position
in the lagged net wealth distribution (indicated by quintile dummies) and the transfer amount,
both linearly and squared. The model interpretation thereby becomes increasingly cumbersome.
Columns (1) to (3) present potentially endogenous results and are rather presented for pedagog-
ical reasons:
Column (1) contains the results of an OLS regression of wealth (instead of savings) on the
usual controls and interacting transfers with (not instrumented) indicators for the last periods’
wealth position of households. The estimation is conceptually problematic, as the dependent
variable is a stock and the key explanatory variables indicate flows. The estimation also fails to
allow for individual fixed effects and is thus most likely to yield biased estimates. The results are
nonetheless reported as this specification might be considered representing the most intuitive ap-
proach to display descriptively the differences between households from different wealth quintiles
in saving from transfers. The estimated savings pattern over the wealth distribution roughly
coincides with the often stated expectations: The poor save comparably little from transfers,
the rich are much more capable of transforming wealth transfers into wealth.47 These estimates
are economically not necessarily illustrative, but will serve below as an extreme scenario in the
simulation chapter (i.e. an upper bound for disequalizing saving patterns and thus the maximum
disequalizing effect of transfers).
Replacing the dependent variable wealth by savings yields the results of column (2) and col-
umn (3), which adds a squared term to the specification. The otherwise unaltered specifications
still do not allow for time constant heterogeneity and still do not instrument the wealth quintile
indicators.48 These two models rather serve as OLS-benchmarks.
47The differences are however not statistically significant.
48The endogeneity issue here is apparent: The dependent variable is defined as St = Wt −Wt−1 while the
interactions on the right hand side include quintile indicators of Wt−1.
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The expected saving pattern from column (1) has already vanished in the results of column
(2) and (3). In particular the results from the model which only includes dummy and linear term
appear irritating as the richest heirs would not necessarily gain by inheriting while all other heirs
at least deviate significantly with respect to the linear savings terms. The model underlying
column (3) then adds the squared inheritance amount. The estimated pattern appears similarly
implausible: For most inheritances accruing in the top wealth quintile the saving effect is negative.
After all, these benchmarks are likely to be biased, the estimated patterns are hardly illustrative.
Column (4) and (5) eventually present presumably consistent estimates of the savings behav-
ior of households after transfer receipt and its variation over the lagged wealth distribution:49
The models underlying column (4) and (5) of table 6 correspond to those of column (4) and (5)
of table 5 except for that they add the interaction terms as formulated in equation 4.10.
The results from the model with dummy and linear term suggest the following saving pat-
tern over the wealth distribution: The negative dummy for the top quintile indicates that only
transfers beyond 92.000 Euro on average entail an increase in the savings of the richest 20 % of
heirs. This value is well above the median (≈ 34.000 Euro) and well below the mean transfer
in this quintile (≈ 148.000 Euro). The marginal effects implies that, conditional on being a
heir in this quintile, fairly half of an inherited Euro is saved. Considering the mean transfer in
this quintile, only 1/5th of it would be saved, on average. The interaction effects estimating the
savings behavior of the heirs from the lower quintiles indicate how their behavior deviates from
the one in the top quintile. Considering the mean transfers in their quintiles, the first (saving
1/10th) and the third (saving half) show high propensities to consume. The second and fourth
quintile save almost their entire transfers, judging from their mean transfers. Hence, this esti-
mation does not allow to identify a somewhat consistent savings pattern over the lagged wealth
distribution. Instead, neither do heirs in the bottom 4 quintiles deviate significantly (insignifi-
cance of interaction terms) from the savings behavior of the richest heirs (main effect) nor bear
the estimates for the richest heirs significance on conventional levels (jointly significant only on
the 29 % level). In accordance with the findings in section 7.1, there is again no sufficient evi-
dence for dynamic effects, short and long term effects do not differ significantly.50 Neither does
the observed quintile-specific savings pattern allow to infer that the wealth endowment of heirs
(conditional on the further controls) determines the households’ treatment of transfers unam-
biguously in one direction (as assumed e.g. in the simulation in Wolff and Gittleman [2014].51
Nor does the accuracy of the estimation allows to derive insights about the consumption behavior
of groups of heirs. The estimated results are insignificant throughout. A single take-away might
49The first stage estimation results are not reported here as they encompass 25 estimations (5 instrumented
variables in 5 imputed data sets). The results are however available on request.
50Again, the linear control for lagged wealth Wt−1 yields an estimate of ρ ≈ −1, leaving the γ parameter as
defined in eq. 4.6 insignificantly different from 0. As the interaction approach however requires to take lagged
wealth into account in anyway, the parameter remains in the presented models.
Column (5) again adds a squared term for the inheritance amount to the model and otherwise equals the
estimation underlying column (4). The results, however, also do not provide further insights:
51The authors here assume that the savings rate rises proportionally with wealth with a specified slope param-
eter. Compare Simulation on p. 462ff.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity in the savings effect across the wealth distribution:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS1,2 OLS1,2 OLS1,2 FD with IV1 FD with IV1
Dependent variable Wealth Savings Savings Savings Savings
Transfer Dummy -22570.17 41238.46 -25010.13 -48144.90 56497.38
(31162.20) (36861.78) (30425.40) (38270.29) (108247.19)
Transfer ×WD=1t−1 19747.47 -40850.10 13395.80 57910.75 -30453.94
(33179.19) (38731.44) (32504.36) (46477.22) (109084.39)
Transfer ×WD=2t−1 15025.61 -47064.41 15992.04 54543.62 -54392.89
(32196.80) (37988.95) (32121.89) (38196.77) (113852.24)
Transfer ×WD=3t−1 18365.55 -47241.97 -2651.93 43068.56 -72608.87
(32660.05) (38518.45) (35715.11) (41002.12) (110833.15)
Transfer ×WD=4t−1 -905.10 -63584.25 22617.85 50767.62 -63890.78
(35150.30) (39938.61) (34612.52) (44077.53) (123757.94)
Amount 8224.48*** -5010.79 4863.45 5203.38 -21202.03
(1655.41) (3656.40) (3712.52) (3381.01) (30418.45)
Amount ×WD=1t−1 -3209.60* 10787.41*** 5438.58 -4773.42 16464.38
(1946.35) (4070.28) (5272.45) (4910.57) (31502.95)
Amount ×WD=2t−1 99.72 13354.13*** 4722.31 -1851.04 26425.88
(2460.27) (4095.77) (8371.72) (3979.23) (33020.64)
Amount ×WD=3t−1 -2515.75 10961.51** 9145.04 -4241.99 26210.57
(3044.58) (4380.45) (7156.12) (3754.47) (31546.29)
Amount ×WD=4t−1 2346.93 15463.16*** -1544.06 -166.63 28348.90
(3137.53) (4416.35) (4274.37) (4155.97) (35587.92)
Amount2 -59.30*** 0.00
(14.75) (0.00)
Amount2 ×WD=1t−1 24.40 -555.58
(28.19) (785.72)
Amount2 ×WD=2t−1 43.89 -617.12
(76.64) (803.41)
Amount2 ×WD=3t−1 -75.86 -655.92
(72.96) (796.34)




Controls 3 3 3 3 3
Number of observations 10400 10400 10400 5200 5200
Note that each column includes the estimates from a single estimation, the middle rule just
separates estimates to increase readability.
1 Control variables: All parameters are conditional on controlling for a third order polynomial
of age, a second order polynomial of household income and their interactions. Estimated
with cluster robust standard errors. Complete estimation results are reported in table 16
the appendix. Intergenerational transfers are expressed in 10.000 Euros.
2 Main effects of wealth quintile indicators reported in the table 16 in the appendix.
Estimations based on SOEP v30.
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be, that adding the squared terms in fact affects the suggested savings pattern over quintiles.
7.3 Discussion of results
The results presented in the previous section are surprising: The wealth endowment of a house-
hold does not seem to significantly impact how households adjust their savings behavior to the
receipt of intergenerational transfers. The absence of a significant dynamic effect also implies
that there is no gradual consumption (resp. saving) from intergenerational transfers. Households
are thus expected to consume as much from a very recent transfer receipt as from one received
long ago. 52
Economically, it is conceivable that behavioral reactions across the wealth distribution do
not differ significantly.53 Households consumption will primarily depend on permanent income,
negative transitory shocks are generally mitigated by welfare state institutions. Hence, there is
not necessarily a need for higher consumption out of transfers in lower wealth quantiles.
Nonetheless, methodological issues and data limitations might contribute to the results: It is
for instance conceivable that the households dynamic adjustment of their consumption path is
not accurately identified. As noted above, the data structure entails that people are on average
observed 2 years after receipt. Households might already have fully adjusted consumption within
this time. It then appears as if households “immediately” consume the estimated and substantial
share of roughly 1/3 of the transfer and might save the rest for e.g. own bequest considerations.
Partly, the adjustment of the consumption path is also concealed by the returns accruing to
the transfer receipts and that in itself might vary over the wealth distribution, as e.g. noted by
Piketty [2014]. Also, as mentioned above, the pace of the dynamic adjustment of consumption is
likely to be related to the wealth type of the transfer. Inherited real estate is less liquid than e.g.
financial transfers [Westerheide, 2005]. My results might thus also reflect rather the immediate
consumption from liquid assets and while not covering the longer term adjustments towards
business capital and real estate. This shortcoming is however not only related to the lack of
surveying the wealth type of the transfer but also the rather limited period of time covered by
the data at hand.
The lack of significance may also be attributable to the costly estimation approach: Af-
ter accounting for fixed effects and instrumenting lagged wealth, the analysis rests on a single
time period only. The multiple imputation approach adds further uncertainty, the interaction
approach virtually reduces the number of incidents per estimate and draws some degrees of free-
dom.54 Improved data and methods might also reveal that the absence of dynamics results from
the fact that some households invest their transfers and generate returns while others dissave.
52Also Westerheide [2005] does not find much variation in the saved share of transfers depending on whether
they were received recently or already 5 or even 10 years ago.
53Looking at the relationship between saving behavior and income levels Brenke and Pfannkuche [2018] provides
descriptive evidence suggesting that the savings rate varies with income. Income and savings rate are however
obviously endogenously chosen.
54The statistical power however still maintains comparably low standard errors.
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These effects could balance each other to some degree. I will take up the role of expectations for
these results in the robustness part, section 8.
7.4 Simulation
The purpose of this paper is to track down the distributional effects that intergenerational
transfers have on the household net wealth distribution. One can describe this effect using
the following two distributions:
• W obs: This is the net wealth distribution as observed in the SOEP (pooled over the periods
of 2002, 2007 and 2012).
• Wnet: This counterfactual distribution is the actual wealth distribution net of transfers.
Note that this distribution is not derived by W obsH,t −BH,t but by Wnet = W obsH,t −βτ ×BH,t
in order to take into account the savings behavior of households after transfer receipt.
Calculating the difference between the inequality between Wnet and W obs then yields the overall
effect of transfers on the wealth distribution: G(Wnet) − G(W obs), where G() is some function
describing an inequality index.
As described in section 3, I would like to decompose this overall effect in order to identify
in how far a heterogeneous saving behavior and the transfer incidence contribute to the overall
inequality effect of intergenerational transfers.55 I will use some of the estimation results so far
derived in this paper in order to quantify the impact of these effects and to derive the overall effect
of transfers on wealth. To do so, I will estimate inequality indices for two further counterfactual
distributions of wealth after transfer receipt:
• W equ: Describes a counterfactual distribution required to identify in how far the incidence
effect is driving the distributional implications in the overall effect. Using estimates of a
tobit model56 of the form described in appendix section 10.2.3, one can simulate a dis-
tribution of transfers that divides the aggregated bequest flow equally among the wealth
quintiles in the sense that the expected unconditional transfer sizes over quintiles are equal
in the counterfactual distribution. The difficulty here is that the incidence effect, as ex-
plained above, implies that both P (B > 0)τ and E(B|B > 0)τ differ across quintiles. In
order to balance expected transfer sizes across quintiles only along the intensive margin,
the tobit estimates are helpful for taking into account the differing shares of heirs over
quintiles, i.e. the variations in P (B > 0|τ).57 The expected (unconditional) transfer in
55The overall effect furthermore is a function of the ratio of the initial net worth of households and its relative
size to transfers. I do not alter the wealth distribution and do not alter the aggregate transfer volume. Identifying
the incidence effect however reveals in how far the distribution of transfers across the wealth distribution is driving
the distributional effect of transfers.
56The model is similar to the one underlying the the descriptive results in table 4 (but leaving the age and
income controls aside).
57Note that the equal distribution of transfers among wealth quintiles does neither imply that all households
receive the same hypothetical transfer nor that transfers would have no distributional impact on wealth. It
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wealth quintile τ is estimated to equal:
Eˆ(B|τ)τ = Pˆ (B > 0|τ)τ × Eˆ(B|τ,B > 0)τ (7.1)
In order to get the counterfactual while keeping the total sum of transfers constant, one
requires a hypothetical reallocation of the transfers between quintiles that balances the
respective differences between quantile-specific expected transfers and the global expected
(unconditional) transfer. This is equivalent to solve for xτ in
P (B > 0|τ)× (E(B|τ,B > 0) + xτ ) != E¯(B)
and to add xτ to each households’ transfer in the respective quantile τ . The counterfactual
distribution of transfers then is
BˆequH,t,τ = BH,t +
E¯(B)− Eˆ(B|τ)τ
Pˆ (B > 0)τ
. (7.2)
Where Eˆ(B|τ)τ is the expected (unconditional) transfer size in wealth quintile τ and E¯(B)
the overall expected (unconditional) transfer size. The tobit estimation parcels out the total
effect, as displayed in eq. 7.1, in extensive and intensive margin and thus provides with
estimates for Pˆ (B > 0)τ (extensive margin) and Eˆ(B|τ,B > 0)τ (intensive margin) the
elements for the calculation of the counterfactual distribution as described in 7.2. BequH,t,τ
is derived by adding the quintile specific difference between the overall expected value of
transfers and the quintile specific expected transfer to each transfer of this quintile.58 The
resulting transfer distribution is net of the incidence effect as it implies the same expected
transfers per wealth quintile.59
The distribution W equ = Wnet + Bequ then allows to identify the inequality effect of the
transfer incidence as G(Wnet)−G(W equ).60
rather means that the expected (unconditional) transfer size for each quintile of the lagged wealth distribution
is roughly same. This does not translate into equally sized transfers for all households as the share of heirs (i.e.
P (B > 0)) varies over quintiles. In order to keep E(B|τ) = P (B > 0|τ)× E(B|B > 0, τ) constant over quintiles,
E(B|B > 0, τ) has to adjust according to the given P (B > 0|τ) (as one would otherwise need to somehow choose
counterfactual heirs).
58While the distributional analysis in this section uses pooled wealth data over the three time periods, W equ
is calculated separately for 2002, 2007 and 2012.
59The aggregate transfer amount is kept constant by this procedure as the deductions for households above the
mean balance the surplus of households below the overall mean transfer. Note as well that the given procedure
balances the expected transfer per quintile by the absolute transfer amount only. Hence, given the incidence
effect, as there are fewer recipients of transfers in the bottom quintiles, these households’ receipts will be above
the average expected transfer in order to balance the higher number of recipients in upper wealth quintiles.
This way, there is no need to turn observed non-heirs into heirs in the bottom quintiles in order to equalize the
transfer volume accruing in the bottom quintiles. Figure 4 in the appendix displays the distributional effect of
the counterfactual accrual of transfers in a Lorenz diagram for 2012.
60It would be furthermore possible to generate the distribution W spar = Wnet + βτ ×Bequ. This distribution
would permit to identify the effect of heterogeneous savings behavior by G(Wnet) − G(W spar). Differences of
this effect to the overall effect would then be attributable to the incidence effect. In order spare the reader of yet
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• Wmech: This distribution is defined as Wmech = Wnet + B and allows to identify the the
actual mechanical effect of transfers on the wealth distribution as G(Wnet) − G(W post).
The mechanical effect ignores the impact of transfers on the savings behavior of households
(i.e. neglects βτ ). Hence, if the mechanical effect would differ substantially from the
overall effect, this difference would be attributable to the heterogeneous savings behavior
of households after the receipt of transfers.
The proposed decomposition aims at equalizing the unconditional expected transfer size over
quantiles in order to measure the impact of potentially systematic variations over the wealth
distribution with direct distributional implications. The variation in transfer sizes within quan-
tiles is however typically higher than between quantiles. The decomposition here thus is a coarse
tool assessing only a single dimension of the variation in transfers. Also, the decomposition
manipulates transfer distributions in order to reach evenly distributed expected transfers sizes in
all quantiles of the wealth distribution. Another promising approach to reach such distributions
could use the variations in transfers within quantiles and simply manipulate the households’
survey weights. Such an approach is considered equivalent to the approach implemented here.
The overall effect of intergenerational transfers contains both the incidence effect and the
effect on the savings behavior of households. The decomposition seeks to point these underlying
dynamics out. Tables 7 and 8 provide a number of inequality indices for the mentioned four
distributions. Note that the distributions in the panels a, c and d rest on βτ estimates. The
distributions in the panels b to d include transfers, whereas different concepts of transfers. Panel
a shows the only net-of-transfer distribution. While the results in table 7 base on the preferred
βτ estimates as presented in column (4) of table 6, table 8 rather serves as a robustness check
using the endogenous estimates of column (1) in table 6, which bear a savings pattern closer to
the initial expectations.
Table 7 presents the main results of the simulation by listing the estimated inequality in the
four relevant wealth distributions. Inequality is expressed by four relative inequality indices (the
Gini index61, Coefficient of Variation62 and the 90/50 and 75/25 percentile ratios.) and, in the
last column, an absolute one (the difference between the 75th and 25th wealth percentile). The
Gini index is reported twice: The Gini0 only considers households with non-negative wealth in
order to reflect a Gini measure bound between 0 and 1.63 While the unrestricted Gini index
overestimates inequality, the restricted will underestimate inequality due to the systematic omis-
sion of the lower end of the wealth distribution. The most reliable inequality measure here is
another counterfactual distribution, the effect of heterogeneous savings is identified as described above.
61Note that the Gini index looses his characteristic of being bound between 0 and 1 as wealth data contains
negative values. In this case, the Gini could reach values above 1. Also, subtracting the saved share of transfers
from observed wealth to reach the distribution Wnet affects the share of households with negative wealth rendering
the Gini indexes not necessarily comparable to each other.
62The CV is defined as the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean, i.e. CV = σ
µ
. Due to the
mentioned flaws of the Gini index in the context of wealth data, the CV is commonly used as reference in
measuring wealth inequality.
63It is common to report this reference as the Gini index in context of wealth and without restrictions to
non-negative values might be heavily misleading.
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Table 7: Inequality in actual and counterfactual wealth distributions:
Gini Gini0 CV p90/p50 p75/p25 p75-p25
a.Wnet: Counterfactual wealth net of transfers.
Index .755 .69 2.38 8.63 331 184,829
Std. error .0138 .01 .129 .561 119 6,049
Distributions including transfers:
b.W obs: Wealth distribution as observed:
Index .734 .685 2.25 7.97 99.5 196,153
Std. error .0118 .0101 .128 .479 57.7 6,028
c.Wmech: Transfers added w/o heterogeneous savings behavior.
Index .752 .692 2.35 8.5 234 186,900
Std. error .0134 .01 .129 .498 91.5 5,870
d.W equ: Transfers added w/o incidence and savings effect.
Index .743 .684 2.2 7.84 165 181,999
Std. error .0158 .0103 .163 .524 75.5 5,929
Note: SOEP v30, own calculations. Results are weighted. Data pooled
across 2002-2012 periods.
thus the CV.
First, panel a gives the wealth inequality in household wealth net of transfers, Wnet. Panel
b reports the inequality in the observed wealth distribution. Comparing the inequality between
panel a and panel b indicates the overall inequality effect of transfers on the household wealth
distribution. According to all relative inequality measures, inequality is about 2 Gini points
higher in the distribution net of wealth transfers. Absolute wealth inequality has risen, though.
Both of these results are well in line with the literature [Wolff and Gittleman, 2014, Elinder et al.,
2016, Karagiannaki, 2015, Boserup et al., 2016]. This result was to be expected after having seen
above that there is no clear pattern found according to which richer households would save
more out of transfers than poorer households. The observed wealth distribution W obs however
is already result of adjustment of the savings behavior of households after bequest receipt. The
literature widely neglects the potential variations in the savings reactions, table 7 panel c therefore
helps to pin down the actual nature of the savings effect:64 Panel c displays the inequality in
wealth if only adding transfers mechanically to the net-of-transfer distribution. Hence, the
distribution neglects the adjustment of the savings behavior of households after bequest receipt.
All relative inequality measures suggest that the inequality in Wmech is higher than in W obs,
implying that the savings behavior as estimated adds strongly to the equalizing effect of transfers
on wealth inequality. This finding opposes the hypothesis of Wolff and Gittleman [2014] who
assumed the savings behavior over the wealth distribution would rather tend to disequalize
wealth. Comparing the panels a and c furthermore leads to the conclusion that controlling for
the savings effect reduces the equalizing effect of transfers substantially. Studies not controlling
for the savings behavior of households might thus heavily overestimate the genuine effects of
64That is, the effect of the savings behavior out of transfers on the inequality effect of transfers
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Figure 2: Stylized illustration of decomposition:
𝑊𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑊𝑒𝑞𝑢







transfers as they attribute the equalizing effect of the savings behavior falsely to transfers in
general.
Panel d then provides the counterfactual inequality in wealth after transfers, if the aggregated
bequest flow would have been equally split among all wealth quintiles. The difference in rela-
tive inequality compared to Wmech is fully attributable to the transfer incidence (as the savings
behavior is kept out of this comparison). It indicates that the relationship between parental
wealth, as represented by the transfer size, and children’s wealth is contributing to wealth in-
equality beyond the transfers observed here.65 66 Note here that W equ = Wnet + BequH,t must
be more equal than WNet and Wmech, but is not necessarily more equal than W obs as W obs
additionally takes the savings effect into account.67 According to the coefficient of variation
and the restricted Gini0 measure, the equalizing effect of equally distributed transfers is slightly
stronger than the equalizing effect of the savings behavior. After all, the incidence effect dise-
qualizes wealth. Note however, that the incidence effect is included when comparing Wnet and
W obs, so that the equalizing forces behind transfer accrual are stronger than the disequalizing
effect of the transfer incidence. Hence, relative transfers are still higher for poorer people and
intergenerational transfers are thus still equalizing wealth inequality.
The decomposition approach presented here adds to the understanding of how transfer accrual
affects wealth inequality. Nonetheless, the differences between most of the inequality measures
in table 7 are not significant and thus only hint to potential relationships that I cannot back with
sufficient evidence. Taking the effect directions as given,Figure 2 gives a stylized illustration of
how the subeffects add up to the observed overall effect.
65In the sense that those households that are comparably rich and receive a comparably high transfer have
become rich already without this very transfer. Hence, there is a strong correlation in wealth across generations
not resulting from the transfers observed here.
66Assuming that e.g. the number of children and other factors contributing do not systematically differ between
rich and poor.
67Taking also the savings effect into account in W equ would however need to result in a more equal distribution
than W obs and seems to be more equal given CV = 2.17.
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Table 8 presents decomposition results as in the previous table, albeit based on the OLS
estimates of βτ (presented in table 6 column (1)), which suggested a strong heterogeneity in the
savings behavior over the wealth distribution and in this context serve as a kind of upper bound of
regressive savings patterns. The pattern suggested that the richest 20 % of the population save a
much higher share of wealth than the bottom 20 % and, considering the tremendous differences in
the estimated indicators, even the bottom 80 % of heirs. The underlying beta estimates are clearly
endogenous, but applying the decomposition to the resulting distribution serves an interesting
illustrative purpose: Interestingly, the decomposition results under this savings behavior do not
differ substantially from those presented above. In fact, even the clearly heterogeneous and rather
regressive savings pattern in the OLS estimation does not revert the equalizing forces of transfers
and thus still yields an equalizing effect of transfer accrual. The reason simply could be that
also this pattern does not indicate a monotonically increasing β over the wealth distribution.The
equalizing effect of the savings behavior has however clearly decreased. The results however show
that small variations in the savings pattern do not necessarily translate in substantial differences
in inequality. Assuming a monotonically increasing relationship between wealth and saving may
thus still revert the equalizing effect of the savings behavior. It is nonetheless unlikely that it
would revert the overall effect, according to the predominant equalizing effect of the aggregate
transfer volume.
After all, the simulation meets concerns by Wolff and Gittleman [2014] that heterogeneous
saving patterns could lead to a disequalizing effect of transfers on the wealth distribution: Even
when identifying the pure savings effect net of the transfer incidence does not warrant such con-
cerns. The estimations presented in this paper suggest in line with the literature, that transfers
tend to equalize inequality in wealth even after taking dynamic adjustments of household be-
havior into account. The effects, while being only partly statistically significant, however seem
rather small and do not necessarily bear economic significance.
8 Robustness
The Robustness section present some simple robustness checks for the estimation of the sav-
ings effect. Namely, exclusion of gifts, expectations concerning future transfer receipts, the time
between transfer receipt and observation of the household and, lastly, excluding extreme obser-
vations.
8.1 Excluding gifts
So far, intergenerational transfers encompass inheritances and inter vivo transfers. While a single
person can bequeath only once (i.e. at death), it may well pass on gifts several times during
the life course. A concern may thus be that the transfer variable in the preceding estimations
is endogenous: Households may have received gifts as financial support in moments of need.
These households would then be likely to show a particularly high propensity to consume out of
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Table 8: Inequality in actual and counterfactual wealth distributions (robustness):
Gini Gini0 CV p90/p50 p75/p25 p75-p25
a.Wnet: Counterfactual wealth net of transfers.
Index .747 .689 2.34 8.42 189 187,524
Std. error .0118 .01 .128 .51 60.9 5,944
Distributions including transfers:
b.W obs: Wealth distribution as observed:
Index .734 .685 2.25 7.97 99.5 196,153
Std. error .0118 .0101 .128 .479 57.7 6,028
c.Wmech: Transfers added w/o heterogeneous savings behavior.
Index .742 .69 2.31 8.38 146 189,995
Std. error .0116 .0102 .127 .501 61.2 6,064
d.W equ: Transfers added w/o incidence and savings effect.
Index .731 .679 2.15 7.31 93.6 187,016
Std. error .013 .0106 .157 .524 57.8 6,111
Note: SOEP v30, own calculations. Results are weighted. Data pooled
across 2002-2012 periods.
transfers. Additionally, preceding gifts may establish a biasing link between observed household
wealth and observed inheritances: The more gifts a household received (before being observed
here), the higher the household’s wealth and the lower the actually observed inheritance. The
estimate of interest would then be downward biased. The latter problem of unobserved preceding
gifts is sufficiently addressed by taking first differences. The former issue, however, requires to
exclude gifts and to only use inheritances as intergenerational transfers.68 Excluding gifts will
of course come at the cost of statistical power: As table 1 shows, almost half of the observed
transfers are transfers between living persons. Table 9 presents some estimation results based
entirely on inheritances. Columns 1 and 2 present OLS estimations with and without control
variables, column 3 reports the FD model (results with inter vivos: table 5, column 2), column
4 the FD-IV model (reference results in table 5, column 4). Compared to the results basing on
all observed transfers, the point estimates in table 9 tend to be somewhat smaller, albeit not
significantly different from those in table 5.69 Hence, there is no evidence that there is a more
pronounced consumption out of gifts, the results rather indicate the opposite. After all, it does
not seem likely that using inheritances and gifts introduces a bias.
68Note that households still can receive more than a single transfer, as they obviously can inherit from different
persons. See footnote 1 for a brief overview of the source of transfers.
69Using Statas ’suest’ command adjusted for multiple imputation yields a p-value for the null hypothesis that
the difference between the amount estimates in e.g. the FD estimation in table 9 and table 5 is 0.258. The
respective p-value for the transfer estimate is 0.873. Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, that the two
coefficients have the same value.
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Table 9: Excluding inter vivo transfers:
Dep.: Savings OLS1 OLS1 FD1 FD with IV1
Amount 7288.77** 7449.48** 5018.64** 2694.47
(3137.91) (3065.32) (2372.56) (2026.20)
Amount squared -60.39*** -59.14***
(18.07) (17.24)
Transfer Dummy -25074.51* -25990.57* -11218.71 -4839.39
(15082.74) (14957.18) (17656.98) (13084.15)
Wt−1 -1.08***
(0.17)
Controls 3 3 3
Number of observations 9863 9863 4929 4929
1 Control variables: All parameters are conditional on controlling for poly-
nomials of age and household income. Estimated with cluster robust
standard errors.
+ Intergenerational transfers are expressed in 10.000 Euros.
+ Estimations based on SOEP v30.
8.2 Expectations about future transfer receipts
Economic theory predicts that expectations about future transfers will affect the consumption
and savings behavior of individuals over the life cycle. In brief, individuals who are certain
to receive a transfer will already take the expected future transfer amount into account when
trading off current utility from consumption and saving. Everything else equal, one would expect
higher consumption rate out of unexpected transfers. Considering the approach in this paper,
expectations will enter the estimation in the error term. If they are time-variant, they could
also interfere with the estimation: If expectations correlate with e.g. amount, then they could
bias the parameter of interest. As described in section 5, the SOEP enquired in 2001, whether
individuals expected to receive an intergenerational transfer. Respondents could reply with “Yes,
that is certain”, “Yes, probably”, “No” and “I don’t know”. Figure 5 in the appendix seeks to
validate these statements by plotting the share of households that eventually received a transfer
statement category over time. While respondents stating that a receipt is certain or likely show
a higher relative probability to actually receive a transfer in the following periods, differences
between answers appear small and rather noisy. I thus summarize the groups into, first, the
group of those who somehow expect to receive and, second, in those who either do not know
or seem to be certain not to receive. Figure 3 displays the relative probability of respondents
from these groups to actually receive a transfer between 2001 and 2012: In fact, people who have
stated in 2001 that they are confident to receive a transfer in the unspecified future seem to be
slightly more likely to actually receive a transfer. Roughly 6 % of the households in this group
receive a transfer over the observed following decade. The group of non-expectators is a bit less
likely to receive, showing only about 2 % of the households inheriting.
In order to test whether these differences in expectations translate into different saving be-
haviors after bequest receipt, I interact the variables amount and transfer as in equation 4.6 with
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Year of receipt
Yes, that is certain / Yes, probably No / Don't know
SOEP v30, own calcualtions.
Share of receiving households of those
who were asked in 2001 whether they expect to receive a transfer:
the indicator variable differentiating between expecting and non-expecting households. The re-
sults of this test are displayed in table 10, in the columns headed with Expectations: Note first,
that the interaction with expected further complicates the interpretation.70 The main effects
describe the behavior of recipients who did not anticipate their receipt.71 Both of which are
insignificant, individually and jointly, which suggests a rather inaccurate estimation and which
is also facilitated by a particularly high propensity to consume out of unexpected transfers. The
interaction terms with expected describe the behavior of individuals that anticipated their re-
ceipt. In fact, the point estimates suggest that, conditional on receipt, households tend to save
slightly more out of expected transfers (≈ 1/2 of an inherited Euro). Taking into account the
intercepts, however, renders the total effect of e.g. the average transfer amount insignificant.
The savings effect of anticipating heirs is thus also not significantly different from the savings
effect of non-expecting heirs.72 The second column of results displays the corresponding results
for the model that additionally controls for lagged wealth. The results are similar in that they
equally suggest a higher savings propensity out of transfers for anticipating heirs conditional on
receipt. Tests of whether dummy and linear term differ between the groups however do not allow
to reject the null hypothesis that there are no differences in the behavior between anticipating
and non-expecting heirs. Also in this specification the estimate for wt−1 does not allow to infer
significant dynamic effects or the necessity to control for households’ lagged wealth.
70As always with interaction terms, the interaction effect only represents the deviation from the main effect. In
this case, however, one still has to take into account that the transfer dummy and amount are implicit interactions,
too.
71Note that expectations are time-constant, as they are observed only once. Hence, they drop out of the FD
specification, the behavior of non-receiving expectators is thus not identified.
72This holds despite the fact that the expecting households save significantly out of transfers (joint significance
on 1 % level). Nevertheless, the groups do not differ significantly from another.
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After all, while there is weak evidence that heirs who expect to receive a transfer tend to
save more and consume less out of eventually received transfers, these deviations are estimated
comparably imprecisely and do not allow to infer systematic differences in the savings behavior
based on expectations. Similar evidence is for instance found by Brown et al. [2010] or Doorley
and Pestel [2016]: Brown and colleagues analyze the extensive margin of labor supply based on
the early retirement behavior of heirs and controlling for expectations. While they find that heirs
of unexpected transfers react more strongly (which is coherent with the implicit consumption
patterns estimated here), the differences between the groups of expecting and non-expecting
recipients is statistically not significant. Doorley and Pestel [2016] use the same data set as the
present study and do not succeed in establishing deviating behaviors based on expectations.
Interacting the transfer-related variables with the expectations indicator in the model for
heterogeneous savings effects (see equation 4.10) does also not reveal systematic differences in
the savings behavior over the wealth distribution or between expecting and non-expecting heirs.
The results of the estimation are thus not presented here.
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Table 10: Robustness of the average saving effect:
Expectations Timing of receipt Outlier sensitivity
Dep.: Savings FD1 FD with IV1 FD1 FD with IV1 FD1 FD with IV1,2
Amount 3033.51 -333.24 5607.29*** 2848.33** 6425.91*** 3514.17***
(2778.75) (1883.85) (1874.62) (1437.17) (1688.27) (1065.30)
Amount× Expected 4654.32 5681.04**
(3429.64) (2531.57)
Transfer Dummy -885.58 2691.47 231.04 -1956.86
(13403.62) (9260.21) (10518.51) (6794.62)
Transfer× Expected -16228.05 -14495.77
(34142.37) (18134.85)
Wt−1 -1.04*** -1.06*** -0.86***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.08)
Transfer in t -14265.83 15847.17
(29429.11) (17218.45)
Transfer in t− 1 -44742.58 -1113.94
(39779.56) (19365.61)
Transfer in t− 2 -12157.24 -748.33
(22669.85) (16833.69)
Transfer in t− 3 22320.65 14530.60
(37081.43) (17566.74)
Transfer in t− 4 5297.63 -15539.07
(36674.41) (16342.07)
Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Number of observations 5158 5158 5200 5200 5200 5200
1 Control variables: All parameters are conditional on controlling for polynomials of age and household
income. Estimated with cluster robust standard errors.
2 Topcoding: Inheritances above p99 (99th percentile) are replaced by the value of p99. Similarly, wealth
below p1 and above p99 is replaced by the respective values.
+ Intergenerational transfers are expressed in 10.000 Euros.
+ Estimations based on SOEP v30.
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8.3 Timing of receipt
As described in section 5, intergenerational transfers are aggregated over the four years prior to
and the year of the wealth observation itself. The temporal difference between year of receipt and
year of wealth observation are however known, which permits to explicitly control or specify the
timing of receipt.73 Generally, assuming a steady consumption from received transfers, one would
expect that transfers received already 4 years ago (i.e. in t−4) contribute less to observed savings
than more recent receipts. Consistently with the negligible dynamic effects documented in table
5 and table 6, I do not manage to gather sufficient evidence that these patterns systematically
occur. The columns labeled timing of receipt in table 10 allow to draw this conclusion. While
there are naturally multiple ways to test the impact of the timing of receipt,74 I decided to split
up the transfer dummy in 5 timing-of-receipt determined dummies. That is, I estimate separate
intercepts for the 5 different timings of receipt, keeping the linear term constant.
As expected, the amount estimates are very similar to the main results presented in table
5. The separately estimated intercepts vary unsystematically and are estimated with substantial
uncertainty. Hence, there is no clear pattern of a steady consumption stream from transfers over
time.75
8.4 Outlier
In order to check whether results are significantly driven by few but extreme observations,76 I
resort to a top and bottom coding approach:77 I calculate the 99th and 1st percentile for wealth
taking the multiple imputation approach into account and replace values below p1 and above p99
with the value of p1 and p99 respectively. I proceed accordingly for intergenerational transfers.
The results are displayed in columns 6 and 7 of table 10. In fact, the point estimates for
amount do not differ significantly from the baseline estimation. Slight changes are however
visible with respect to ρ: The parameter that indicates dynamic effects has fallen to roughly .86,
which implies that γ = ρ+ 1 = 0.14 is close to being statistically different from zero (p ≈ 0.064).
73Specifying the timing is not needed to prevent an omitted variable bias in the estimation as it is not clear
why the timing of receipt should correlate with e.g. the amount of a transfer. Allowing the model for variations
in the timing of receipt rather can reveal an interesting behavioral effect in itself.
74I also tested estimating separate linear amount parameters depending on the timing of receipt or interacted
the amount variable with a further variable indicating the timing of receipt. While none of these procedures
revealed a systematic variation in the savings contributions of a transfer, the latter procedure is additionally
cumbersome as it introduces a further implicit interaction term with amount.
75Westerheide [2005], as noted above, tries to consider all reported transfers in his analysis. Interestingly, he
does also not find a clear pattern of consumption over time.
76Karagiannaki [2015] provides quantile regression-based estimates for the median of the distribution in order
to preclude the impact of such observations.
77While it is generally reasonable to check the sensitivity of the analysis to extreme observations, the main
concern with wealth and inheritance based studies rather results from an insufficient coverage of rich households
and households with high transfer receipts [Vermeulen, 2014]. This is also why studies resort to cumbersome
methods seeking to display the top of the distribution correctly. See for instance Saez and Zucman [2016]. Top
coding thus further withdraws information from a sensitive part of the distribution. Nonetheless, this approach
allows to illustrate the impact of those few extreme observations of which a truly complete data set might have
more.
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The long term β would then indicate a slowly increasing savings share after bequest receipt, a
pattern probably attributable to returns to savings. The evidence in this regard is however weak,
excluding further wealth observations also difficult to justify. I tested, whether these dynamics
translate into differences in the savings behavior over the wealth distribution by re-running model
4.10 on the outlier-corrected sample but did not find patterns challenging previous conclusions.
9 Conclusions
This paper utilizes German panel data from the SOEP in order to evaluate the effect of inter-
generational transfers on the inequality in households’ net worth distribution. In particular, the
paper seeks to decompose the effect: First, households receiving a transfer do not necessarily
save the entire transfer. They rather adjust their economic behavior to the new financial condi-
tions, which might entail that transfer savings displace regular savings and thus a post-transfer
household wealth below their initial wealth plus the nominal transfers. I therefore estimate the
causal effect of transfer receipt on the savings behavior of households allowing for dynamic ad-
justment and for heterogeneities in the parameter of interest over the wealth distribution. This is
important, as Wolff and Gittleman [2014] and Karagiannaki [2015] hypothesize that such hetero-
geneities could crucially shape the inequality effect of transfers. Secondly, using tobit regression
techniques, I estimate how intergenerational transfers scatter over the wealth distribution. I use
the causal estimates from the first and the descriptive evidence from the second step in order to
decompose the overall effect of transfers in three subeffects: First, in an aggregate flow volume
effect, the incidence effect and the savings effect.
The results of the paper are well in line with the literature and suggest that intergenerational
transfers have a widely equalizing effect on the wealth distribution. This equalizing effect is
primarily attributable to the aggregate transfer volume, which causes that bequests tend to
be relatively bigger for poorer households. The incidence effect, which entails that households
receive transfers more often and typically on a bigger scale, greatly counteracts this effect, while
not exceeding the progressive nature of the aggregate transfer volume effect. Lastly, there is no
evidence that heterogeneities in the savings behavior of households after bequest receipt have a
substantial impact on the overall distributional effect of transfers on wealth inequality. The here
estimated variations in savings over the wealth distribution rather tend to add to the equalizing
nature of transfers. While it is however well conceivable that other patterns of saving over the
wealth distribution might overturn the present results, none of the estimations in this paper
justifies concerns that transfer accrual was recently disequalizing wealth inequality in Germany.
The results also convey considerable differences to those in the publications by Wolff [2015],
Karagiannaki [2015] which suggested higher savings rates out of intergenerational transfers. All
three studies may well describe the statistical relationships in the respective countries appropri-
ately. The existing gaps remind not to generalize the results of descriptive studies.According to
the results in this paper, households on average save only about 2/3 of their transfer within a
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2 years period after receipt and do not show a consistent dissaving (or reinvestment) behavior
thereafter.
All results are subject to the common limitations of empirical studies with wealth and inter-
generational transfers, though: Despite multiple imputation and weighting schemes, there are
retaining concerns that survey data does not fully depict the wealth distribution [Vermeulen,
2014]. Similar concerns may be justified for the transfer distribution in general and the underly-
ing limited understanding of intergenerational transfers as primarily monetary advantages. The
equalizing effect of transfers also only holds for relative inequality indices. Absolute inequality
measures, while being of less importance in economics, consistently indicate increasing inequality
through transfers, which might be of interest for other research fields. Finally, the given study
focuses on the important topic of intergenerational transfers between households but thereby
also neglects that resources might well have been shared within families across households be-
fore the formal transfer. The study of the inequality between dynasties and its dependence of
intergenerational transfers is thus of equal importance.
Future research in this field could devote some attention to the question what purposes
households consume their transfers for. Also, the link between bequest receipt and own bequest
motives deserves further research.
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Table 11 describes the quintile cut-off points as used for the construction of the quintile dummy
set in the main estimation.
Table 11: Appendix: Quantile cut-offs as used in estimation
2002 2007 2012 Total
(distinction as used in estimation)
Q20 0 0 0 0
Q40 17006 22899 18636 19298
Q60 100564 101157 93996 97253
Q80 255711 250023 227471 242371
SOEPv30, own calculations. Data is
weighted.
Table 12: Appendix: Dispersal of wealth types: % of HH own wealth of respective type.
2002 2007 2012 Total
Estate (residence owned) 0.42 0.46 0.45 0.45
Estate (other real estate) 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
Insurance 0.56 0.61 0.59 0.59
Financial 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.56
Business 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
Tangible 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.11
Consumer 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.20
SOEPv30, own calculations. Data is weighted.
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Table 13: Appendix: Age of recipients of gifts and inheritances.
2002 2007 2012 Total
Mean age heirs 51 56 54 54
std. 14 13 13 13
Mean gift recipients 43 44 43 44
std. 12 11 10 10




10.2.1 Appendix: Average Effects
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Table 14: Complete results average effects estimation
Dependent variable OLS (no controls) OLS OLS (no interest) FD FD FD with IV FD with IV
Savings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Amount 8864.42*** 8712.12*** 9248.78*** 5997.70*** 655.97 3074.80** 1760.27
(2465.71) (2313.22) (2362.88) (1814.32) (3793.31) (1532.32) (1792.13)
Amount squared -65.00*** -63.14*** -69.82*** 70.61* 17.42
(17.89) (16.06) (15.61) (36.36) (27.18)
Transfer Dummy -14217.97 -25568.60*** -25722.25*** -10080.74 8968.42 -7315.82 -2619.10
(9542.74) (9436.01) (9289.01) (14106.40) (14028.51) (9564.40) (9173.46)
Wt−1 -1.06*** -1.06***
(0.16) (0.16)
Age -40409.84* -40358.45* -65153.24 -62264.77 -14407.91 -13743.02
(22935.03) (22947.67) (42089.03) (42336.52) (34115.18) (34227.75)
Age2 600.55 600.08 1071.17 1007.13 195.21 180.24
(381.94) (382.14) (741.21) (744.05) (554.74) (556.61)
Age3 -2.92 -2.92 -5.13 -4.67 -0.84 -0.73
(2.06) (2.06) (4.10) (4.11) (2.90) (2.92)
Agg HH income -18.23*** -18.21*** -21.85** -20.93** -14.38 -14.16
(6.83) (6.83) (10.16) (10.34) (11.40) (11.47)
Age×Agg HH income 0.88*** 0.88*** 1.11** 1.05* 0.62 0.60
(0.34) (0.34) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.56)
Age2 ×Agg HH income -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** -0.02* -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age3 ×Agg HH income 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Agg HH income2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age×Agg HH income2 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age2 ×Agg HH income2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age3 ×Agg HH income2 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year Dummy 2007 0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
Year Dummy 2012 3793.36 3845.40
(7083.44) (7084.30)
constant -1737.86 882024.39* 880842.29* -16591.63 -17306.00 -6071.20 -6260.80
(3182.37) (444189.92) (444455.90) (14354.74) (14334.20) (7769.94) (7789.71)
Number of observations 10400 10400 10400 5200 5200 5200 5200
1 Control variables: All parameters are conditional on controlling for polynomials of age and household income. Estimated with
cluster robust standard errors on the HH level. Complete estimation results are reported in the appendix. Intergenerational
transfers are expressed in 10.000 Euros.
2 First stage results reported in the appendix.
Estimations based on SOEP v30.
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Table 15: First stages of average effect
Dependent var: D.Wt−1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wt−2 -0.44*** -0.47*** -0.27*** -0.39*** -0.37***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
D.Amount -2778.93** -2473.76** -2852.75** -2869.98** -2942.47**
(1229.07) (1182.84) (1210.98) (1204.69) (1206.14)
D.Transfer Dummy -3690.84 -2668.53 -1196.05 -5359.88 -1403.02
(9068.55) (8505.00) (7890.00) (7505.92) (8863.53)
D.Age -9017.28 -13115.91 5096.85 201.11 -1870.57
(30621.82) (27641.73) (24254.44) (24584.75) (25026.83)
D.Age2 70.33 117.46 -154.06 -82.10 -33.19
(532.19) (480.56) (424.35) (429.88) (439.77)
D.Age3 -0.77 -1.02 0.44 0.02 -0.19
(2.94) (2.66) (2.35) (2.39) (2.44)
D.Agg HH income 3.06 3.79 3.52 5.68 3.95
(7.35) (6.57) (5.87) (6.51) (5.98)
D.Agg HH income2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D.Age×Agg HH income -0.23 -0.27 -0.24 -0.37 -0.28
(0.39) (0.35) (0.31) (0.34) (0.32)
D.Age2 ×Agg HH income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D.Age2 ×Agg HH income2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D.Age3 ×Agg HH income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D.Age3 ×Agg HH income2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
constant 92098.05*** 99816.04*** 65368.40*** 87899.34*** 77904.43***
(14230.04) (20559.01) (9505.11) (14741.27) (14799.95)
Number of observations 5200 5200 5200 5200 5200
1 Control variables: All parameters are conditional on controlling for polynomials of age and
household income. Estimated with cluster robust standard errors on the HH level. Complete
estimation results are reported in the appendix. Intergenerational transfers are expressed in
10.000 Euros.
2 First stage results reported in the appendix.
Estimations based on SOEP v30.
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10.2.2 Appendix: Heterogeneous Effects
Note: Table 16 only reports the missing estimates for the control variables from the models
reported in table 6. Specifically, column (1) here in table 16 corresponds to column (1), column
(2) here corresponds to column (4) in table 6 and column (3) here corresponds to the column
(5). This is done as the table would otherwise not capture all estimates.
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Table 16: Control variable estimates of heterogeneous effects estimation:
OLS FD with IV FD with IV
(1) (2) (3)
Specification Dummy + Dummy + Dummy+linear+
linear term linear term squared term
Dependent variable Wealth Savings Savings











Age -538.86 -13053.76 8186.35
(23033.08) (34261.43) (45307.88)
Age2 -143.07 169.10 -322.03
(396.94) (557.25) (864.50)
Age3 1.35 -0.66 2.98
(2.21) (2.91) (5.65)
Agg HH income -9.54 -14.02 -4.93
(6.86) (11.33) (17.36)
Agg HH income2 0.00** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age×Agg HH income 0.33 0.60 -0.00
(0.35) (0.55) (1.01)
Age2 ×Agg HH income -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Age3 ×Agg HH income 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age×Agg HH income2 -0.00* -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age2 ×Agg HH income2 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age3 ×Agg HH income2 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year Dummy 2007 0.00
(.)
Year Dummy 2012 5359.36
(5749.95)
constant 622541.72 -6655.89 -6363.00
(437229.43) (7749.79) (8292.79)
Number of observations 10400 5200 5200
1 Control variables: All parameters are conditional on controlling for polyno-
mials of age and household income. Estimated with cluster robust standard
errors on the HH level. Complete estimation results are reported in the
appendix. Intergenerational transfers are expressed in 10.000 Euros.
Estimations based on SOEP v30.
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10.2.3 Appendix: Simulation
The results of table 17 are derived from a tobit estimation of the form:
B∗H,t = δ +
5∑
q=1
γqI[τ(WH,t−1) = q] + uH,t (10.1)
Where uH,t is the error term, uH,t






0, if B∗H,t ≤ 0
Table 17: Simulation: Auxiliary tobit estimates
Dependent (1) (2)
variable: Amount Tobit 2007 Tobit 2012
Quintile indicator of respective
lagged wealth distribution:
Quintile 1 0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
Quintile 2 42109.04*** 32430.06**
(15479.07) (14563.20)
Quintile 3 90013.02*** 58744.67***
(13158.78) (13825.25)
Quintile 4 84496.35*** 70525.02***
(13774.01) (13812.40)






Number of observations 8185 5731
Estimations based on SOEP v30.
51
















Factual and contrafactual transfers in 2012
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Year of receipt
Yes, that is certain Yes, probably
No Don't know
SOEP v30, own calcualtions.
Share of receiving households of those
who were asked in 2001 whether they expect to receive a transfer:
10.3 Appendix: Robustness
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